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This dissertation consists of 3 chapters.
Chapter 1: Last Minute Earning Forecast Revision
Chapter 2: Security Analysts’ Double Down Behavior in Stock Recommendation
Chapter 3: Cost of Speaking in Two Different Tongues
Chapter 1: I study financial analysts who revise their earnings forecasts just a few days
before firms’ earnings announcement. Analysts who apply this strategy are more accurate
in their earnings forecasts, and they are more likely to move to a larger brokerage firm.
All-star analysts are more likely to take this last minute revision strategy than non-all-star
analysts. All-star analysts using the strategy are likely to maintain their all-star status and
get a better career path, while non-all-star analysts are less likely to get promotion when
they apply this strategy.
Chapter 2: When a stock experiences a significant loss after a favorable recommendation
from an analyst, the analyst can either continue to issue a favorable recommendation or
reverse the course. I define the behavior of continuing favorable coverage as the analyst’s
doubling down behavior.I find analysts who double down are likely to get demoted and less
v
likely to become an all-American analyst in the next year. Analyst makes biased recommen-
dation in the double down behavior because of overconfidence instead of defending the firm.
Stocks recommended by doubling down analysts have worse performance than stocks recom-
mended by other analysts. Investors perform worse if they follow the buy recommendations
of doubling down analysts.
Chapter 3: Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) find that some analysts prefer to issue
relatively higher stock recommendation ratings and relatively lower earnings forecast on the
same firm at the same time. They describe this behavior as speaking in two different tongues.
Following Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014)’s definition of the two-tongue strategy, I
explore the external influence of this strategy on financial analysts. I show that when an-
alysts take the two-tongue strategy, they are suffering a cost by sacrificing their accuracy
on their target firms. The more frequent an analyst takes the two-tongue strategy in the
previous year, the less likely this analyst would be promoted to a top 10 brokerage house and
be nominated as an All-American analyst in the current year. Moreover, investors respond
more positively to the higher stock recommendation ratings but ignore the lower earnings
forecast on the firms where analysts apply the two-tongue strategy by showing no significant
negative reaction.
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Chapter 1
Last Minute Earning Forecast
Revision
1.1 Introduction
Financial analysts function as important players in the security market. They collect firm
information on business entities in order to write reports and communiques about them.
Frequently they issue earnings forecast and recommendations on given securities published
for the benefit and use of the clients for their firm. Of course, there are buy-side analysts
and sell-side analysts. Whether buy-side or sell-side, they seek to achieve better career
path through quality and quantity of their work. Most importantly, a financial analyst
attempts to attract the attention of investors thereby building-up a reputation over time.
The existing literature includes many examples of research on the reputations of analysts
and on the attention investors pay to them. To establish a better career path, these analysts
need to attract investors’ attention and build their reputation. Analyst reputation affects
analysts’ career outcomes (Hong and Kubik (2003b), Leone and Wu (2007)) and their ability
to generate trading commissions (Jackson (2005)). Clement and Tse (2003) touch upon the
1
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notion of limited investor attention to analyst forecasts by showing that investors over-rely on
easily observable summary proxies of forecast accuracy when responding to analyst forecast
revisions, for example, broker size than on other predictors of forecast accuracy. Athanasakou
and Simpson (2014) find that investor does pay attention to what the analysts say and they
pay attention to the salient features of analyst forecasts. These papers talk about the
analysts’ reputation building and investor attention on financial analysts separately.
Security analysts establish and then augment their reputation by timing the release of
their earnings forecast when investor attention is high, for example, when the public an-
nouncement of a firm’s earnings is just around the corner in time. In this way, analysts
are more likely to attract the focus of investors on their output thereby making themselves
familiar to investors. Essentially this study combines two aspects of security analysts into a
unifying whole: one, analyst reputation building and two, the attention paying of investors
to analysts and their work. In particular, I study analysts who revise their earnings forecasts
just a few days before firms’ earnings announcement. In addition, this study show the differ-
ent impact of last minute earning forecast revision made by all-star (viz., high reputation)
analysts in comparison to those made by non-star (viz., moderate high and low reputation)
analysts.
Drake et al. (2012) find investors tend to increase their attention two weeks prior to the
firms’ earnings announcement by studying from Google search data. Investors’ attention
reaches the highest level in the last week before the firm’s earnings announcement. Forecasts
made by analysts during this time are more likely to grab the attention of investors. Ac-
cordingly, I define a last minute earning forecast as one that is made within seven calendar
days period immediately prior to the public earnings announcement of the firm in question.
Subsequent to this, this paper investigates specific analyst characteristics which possibly can
influence the probability (or likelihood) of making a last minute earning revision. A key
finding of this study is high reputation analysts are more likely to make last minute revision.
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Also, this behavior persists into the future: analysts making last minute revisions are more
likely to do so again in the next fiscal quarter.
To test whether or not making a last minute earnings revision has a strategic goal of
the analysts attracting the attention of investors, I check the accuracy of these analysts’
forecasts. If an analyst desires to attract attention, a forecast issued within the the last seven
calendar days may be able to catch the investor eyeballs. However, an inaccurate forecast
also would attract investor attention and presumably would be detrimental to the reputation
of the analyst. Indeed, and perhaps unsurprisingly, last minute revision forecasts are more
accurate than those forecast made outside the seven calendar days period preceding a firm’s
public earnings announcement. To control for the general trend of these late forecasts, I also
measure the accuracy using relative forecast error, and I find the same result. It indicates
that these last minute earnings forecasts are indeed more accurate and analysts could use
this higher accuracy to grab the investor attention.
If analysts apply this last minute earnings revision strategy to build their reputation, then
the effect will be reflected in their career paths. I check the impact of last minute earnings
revision on the analysts’ career path. To ensure that our result is robust, I apply five different
measurements to measure an analyst’s promotion and demotion in their careers. I find that
the last minute earning revision is helpful for analyst in their career path. Analysts with such
behavior in the previous year are more likely to be promoted and less likely to be demoted
in the next year.
If the last minute earning revision is beneficial to an analyst, then why do only a small
number of analysts adopt this strategy? Why do not all analysts adopt this last minute
earning revision strategy? Derived from the previous results that all-star analysts are more
likely to take the last-minute earning revision, I check the difference between star-analysts
and non star-analysts applying last minute earnings forecast revision. An important finding
of this paper is that the all-star analysts are much more likely to adopt the last-minute
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earnings revision strategy than the non-star analysts. This difference is also reflected in
their career paths. All-star analysts who applied the last minute earnings forecast revision
strategy in the previous year are more likely to be promoted and less likely to be demoted.
On the other hand, for the non-star-analysts, they are less likely to be promoted to a top-ten
brokerage firm and less likely to be nominated as an all-star analyst if they take the same
strategy. The opportunity cost is obvious. Last minute earnings forecast revision only works
for the analysts who already have good reputation. The different influence of the last-minute
earning revision strategy on analysts’ career path between the all-star analysts and non-star
analysts show that this strategy is employed by analysts to maintain their reputation.
One possible issue in this research is endogeneity. Guttman (2010) uses a theoretical
model to show that high learning ability analysts tend to issue their forecasts later. If
those analysts who take the last minute earnings forecast revision strategy are high quality
analysts to begin with, it is quite possible that the better career path is not the result from
the strategy but from the high quality of these analysts. To solve this problem, I adopt
a method in Wooldridge (2002) to solve endogeneity problem. After controlling for the
endogeneity, the results stay robust for the two strict promotion career measurements.
This research makes contributions to the existing research on the two fronts: First,
I combine the analyst reputation and investor attention literature together to show high
reputation analyst strategic behavior to issue last-minute earning revision to maintain their
reputation, and this strategy is only helpful for the high reputation analyst career path.
Second, this paper is complementary to the literature about the timing of analysts’ forecasts
by exploring a very special time window, namely one to five calendar days before earnings
announcement. I find that the revisions made during this period of time are more accurate.
Our work provide empirical evidence to prove the theory of Guttman (2010) that analysts
with high learning ability tend to issue their forecasts later.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the literature review. Section
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3 presents the data and summarizes all the relevant variables I will use in the rest of paper.
Section 4 presents empirical results and the interpretation of these results. Section 5 shows
the Robustness Test of the previous results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
1.2 Literature Review
The topic of attention has been widely studied by researchers in different research areas. Geer
and Kahn (1993) find that politicians take advantage of the headlines to have a sizeable ef-
fect on the views of the subjects and use this way to get the attention of their supporters.
Almazan et al. (2008) prove that managerial announcements not only convey information
to the market but also attract attention to the firm and guide speculators in their investi-
gation efforts. Barber and Odean (2007) show that stocks that experience high abnormal
trading volume and stocks with extreme one-day return are more likely to grab investors’
attention. Firms, managers, politicians use different strategies to attract the attention of
investors, shareholders and supporters. For the same reason, grabbing investors’ attention
is also critical for analysts because the attention of investors could help analysts to build
or maintain a good reputation. Analyst’s reputation could affect their career development
(Hong and Kubik (2003b), Leone and Wu (2007)) and their trading commissions(Jackson
(2005)). Having a good reputation is extremely helpful for an analyst in his or her career
path. But the question for the analysts who want to build or maintain their reputation is
how to attract the attention from the investors.
The previous literature on the investors’ side shows that investors do look for signals to
qualify an analyst. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) argue that investor has limited attention.
Stickel (1992),Park and Stice (2000), Gleason and Lee (2003) show evidence exists that
investors look for more elaborate signals for the expected accuracy of the forecast, such
as past forecasting ability, analyst reputation and brokerage firm affiliation. (Hirshleifer
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and Teoh, 2003) said investors focus on subsets of publicly available information that are
more salient and easier to extract. (Clement and Tse, 2003) touch upon the notion of limited
investor attention to analyst forecasts by showing that investors over-rely on easily observable
summary proxies of forecast accuracy when responding to analyst forecast revisions, for
example, broker size than on other predictors of forecast accuracy. Athanasakou and Simpson
(2014) find iInvestor does pay attention to what the analysts said and they pay attention
to the salient features of analyst forecasts. Then if analysts want to grab the investor’s
or manager’s attention, their method could not be too complex or sophisticated because of
investors limited attention. Taking all conditions from the investor side into consideration,
if analysts want to use a simple signal to grab investor attention, they need find a good
time to send the signal. Now the question for an analyst is what is the good time? Drake
et al. (2012) find investors show an increase in their attention two weeks prior to the firms
earnings announcement. Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) show that earning forecast revisions
are more informative in the week before earnings announcements than the week after the
earnings announcements.
1.3 Data
I get the actual firm earnings and analyst forecast data from the I/B/E/S Detail History files
from 1994 to 2012. The sample is started from 1994 because forecasts may be inaccurate
due to the reason of batch delivery before 1994 in I/B/E/S. I focus on quarterly forecast
and I include all US firms with CRSP data. Then my main sample includes all the public
firms in the three main exchange, NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq. For each firm-analyst, I
use the last forecasts issued by the analyst before firm’s public earning announcement but
following the same firm’s previous public earning announcement. I take the last earnings
forecast by analysts because I want to see the most recent forecast by analysts in my analysis.
CHAPTER 1. ONE 7
Analyst’s employment information is also obtained from the I/B/E/S database by reviewing
the brokerage firm for analysts. Accounting data comes from Compustat annual data and
stock return data is from CRSP daily data.
1.4 Empirical Results
1.4.1 Define last minute earning revision
If an analyst attempts to attract the attention from investors, one of the simplest methods
is to pick up a good time to issue his or her forecast when investors’ interest and attention is
high. Drake et al. (2012) show that investors have an increase in their attention two weeks
prior to the firms’ earnings announcement by applying Google search.
The last minute earning forecast revision period covers one to seven calendar days before
a firm’s earnings announcement because this special period would draw a lot of investors’
attention according to Drake et al. (2012). Another reason for the immediately preceding
7 calendar days period is that the ”timing signal” is salient and may easily be recognized
by the investors. According to the previous studies, investors over-rely on easily observable
summary proxies of forecast accuracy than on other predictors (Clement and Tse, 2003). In
addition to that, Athanasakou and Simpson (2014) find that investors do pay attention to
what the analysts said and they pay attention to salient features of analyst forecasts. Taking
all possible conditions into consideration, I define the last minute earning forecast revision to
be a strategy that issues earning forecast within the 1-7 calendar days before firm’s earnings
announcement.
To define the last minute earning forecast revision in a detailed way, I apply the following
method:
The LMEi,j,t (Last Minute Earning Forecast Revision) is an indicator variable that equals
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to 1 if the forecast issued by an analyst satisfies the following conditions: 1) If an EPS forecast
is issued by an analyst 1 to 7 days before the firms earnings announcement. 2) The EPS
forecast must be the only one forecast of the target firm in that day. In other words, if there
are two EPS forecasts on a same firm issued by two different analysts, even if they are within
the 7 days before the firms earnings announcement, I will not count them to last minute
earning forecast revision. The reason why these forecasts are excluded is because I want to
exclude the forecasts generated by the firm event, if there is an event for the firm within
1-7 calendar days before the firms earnings announcement, then there will be more than one
analysts revise their forecasts about the firm. These kinds of forecasts may be generated by
the firms events that attract analysts attention to revise their forecasts but not generated
directly from analysts.
1.4.2 Define control variables
To get meaningful and accurate rankings, I delete firms covered by fewer than 2 analysts.
All the control variables are ranked with a similar method as those used in previous papers.I
use the method of Hilary and Hsu (2013) to build the control variable of accuracy, boldness,
gap,firm experience and breadth.
Accuracyi,j,t = 1 − (ranki,j,t)/(number of analysts following firm j − 1) (1.1)
First, I calculate the forecast error for analyst in on firm j, then I take the absolute value
of this forecast error. Second, I rank all analysts covering firm j in quarter q based on the
absolute forecast error. In the last, I calculate the mean of the ranking scores and get the
ranking variable.
Boldness is the absolute value of the difference between the forecast by analyst i and the
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street consensus following Ke and Yu (2006). The street consensus is defined as the average
of all the other analysts forecasts for firm j within the past 90 days to the point of the
forecast by analyst i for firm j at time t. Gap is defined as the total number of calendar days
between the analyst forecast date and the firm public announcement date following Clement
and Tse (2003). Firm-Experience is defined following Hong and Kubik (2003a), which is
the log of the number of quarters the analyst has covered the firm. Experience is the log of
the number of years the analyst has in the I/B/E/S following. Breadth is defined following
Hong and Kubik (2003b), which is the number of firms that the analyst gives forecast in a
fiscal given year. Since I measure accuracy by rankings and to keep the consistency, I also
apply ranking variables for Boldness, Gap, Firm-Experience, Experience, and Breadth.
1.4.3 Description of the summary statistics
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for my main variables. In panel A, I provide the
quarter-analyst-firm summary statistics for the variables in the regression of Table 4. It
includes 179411 quarter-analyst observations. Except for the variable LME (Last Minute
Earning Forecast Revision), all the other control variables are defined following the previous
literature. The details are in the Section 3. Panel B provides the summary statistics for
the quarter-analyst variables, all the variables in Panel B are defined the same way as Panel
A except that they are calculated as the average across all the firms by the same analyst
each quarter. Panel C shows the summary statistics for year-analyst results, the variables
are calculated across all the firms covered by the same analyst each year. I have 1245894
quarter-firm-analyst observations and 49787 firm-year observations. I would name the last
minute earning forecast revision to be ”LME” strategy in the rest of this paper.
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1.4.4 Analysts characteristics that could affect the analyst last
minute earning forecast revision strategy
To have a good understanding of what kinds of analysts are more likely to apply the last
minute earning forecast revision strategy, I first explore the analysts characteristics that
could affect analysts LME strategy.
To test the analyst characteristics that may influence the analysts’ LME strategy, I apply
the following Logistic Regression Model:
LMEi,j,t =Allstari,t + LMEi,j,t−1 + Accuracyi,j,t−1 +Boldnessi,j,t + Firm− Experiencei,j,t+
Firm Experience2i,j,t + LogFollowi,j,t +Breadthi,j,t + εi,j,t
(1.2)
Table 2 presents the logistic regression results with quarter fixed effect for the analyst
characteristics that may influence the probability for an analyst to have an Last Minute
Earning Forecast Revision behavior. The dependent variable is a dummy variable. The
coefficient of Allstar is 0.235 with a significant z-statistic of 8.15. The coefficients of LME in
the previous quarter, accuracy in the previous quarter, boldness, LnFollow are all positive
and significant. These positive and significant coefficients indicate that all-star analysts,
analysts with higher boldness and analysts who are more accuracte are more likely to have
an Last Minute Earning Forecast Revision behavior. Considering the risk of an instant
verification (investors will know the accuracy of analysts forecasts several days later) for the
forecasts made by the analyst, more accuracy give analysts who apply last minute earning
forecast revision strategy more advantage and make them more confident to play this ”LME”
game. For the firms followed by more analysts, analysts are also more likely to apply the
Last Minute Earning Forecast Revision strategy. If an analyst did have an Last Minute
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Earning Forecast Revision behavior in the previous quarter, then he or she would be more
likely to be Last Minute Earning Forecast Revision than the analysts who do not have such
a behavior in the previous quarter. On the other hand, the coefficient of Firm-Experience
is -0.148 with a significant z-statistic of -2.56 and the coefficient of Breadth is -0.224 with a
significant z-statistic of -15.79. These results show that analysts who are more experienced
and analysts who cover more firms than the other analysts would be less likely to have the
Last Minute Earning Forecast Revision strategy.
1.4.5 Analyst accuracy in last minute earning forecast revision
Analysts who take the last minute earning forecast revision would take more risk because
they are tolerating the risk of losing the chance to revise their earning forecast revision due
to the time limitation before firm’s earnings announcement date. Their forecasts would be
verified soon several days later after they issue their ”LME” forecasts. As a result, they may
just do this by issuing a gambling forecast or they are confidently to do this and use this as
a strategy to prove their high quality and build their high reputation. In order to explore on
their accuracy in last minute earning forecast revision, I check the accuracy for these ”LME”
analysts from a firm quarter analyst level and a quarter analyst level.
I use the following empirical model to test the accuracy of the ”LME” strategy:
Accuracyi,j,t =LMEi,j,t + Accuracyi, j, t− 1 +Boldnessi,j,t + Firm− Experiencei,j,t+
LogFollowi,j,t +Breadthi,j,t +Gapi,j,t + εi,j,t
(1.3)
CHAPTER 1. ONE 12
Accuracyi,t =LMEi,j,t + Accuracyi, t− 1 +Boldnessi,t + Firm− Experiencei,t+
LogFollowi,t +Breadthi,t +Gapi,t + εi,t
(1.4)
The Column 1 of Table 3 and Column 1 of Table 4 present the results. The coefficient of
LME is positive with a result of 0.0129 and 0.0192, respectively. They are both significant
with a t-value of 8.43 and 5.63, respectively. This proves that the analysts who apply the
last minute earning forecast revision do have a higher accuracy than analysts who do not
apply this strategy. The high accuracy in a firm quarter analyst level and a quarter analyst
level prove that analysts who take last minute earning forecast revision are using this as a
strategy to increase their accuracy instead of giving a random forecast like a gamble before
the firm’s earnings announcement date.
Although I find a higher accuracy for analysts who apply last minute earning forecast
revision, there is a potential problem inside in the model I apply. The analysts who revise
their forecasts within the 1-5 calendar days before earnings announcement will have more
available information than the analysts who revise their forecasts earlier, so the higher accu-
racy may be generated by timing. To solve this problem, I apply the method of Kim et al.
(2011) to build a measurement called the relative forecast error, which could solve the timing
problem. After I build this relative forecast error measurement, I apply the similar method
to give a rank number of all analyst’s relative forecast error covering firm j in time t.
RFEi,j,t = FEi,j,t − CFEi,j,t
FEi,j,t = 100 ∗ abs[(analyst forecasti,j,t − quarterly earningsj,t)/quarterly earningsj,t]
CFEi,j,t = 100∗abs[(consensus forecasti,j,t)−quarterly earningsj,t/quarterly earningsj,t]
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RAi,j,t = 1 − (RFE ranki,j,t)/(number of analysts following firm j − 1) (1.5)
RAi,j,t =LMEi,j,t + Accuracyi, j, t− 1 +Boldnessi,j,t + Firm− Experiencei,j,t+
LogFollowi,j,t +Breadthi,j,t +Gapi,j,t + εi,j,t
(1.6)
RAi,t =LMEi,j,t + Accuracyi, t− 1 +Boldnessi,t + Firm− Experiencei,t+
LogFollowi,t +Breadthi,t +Gapi,t + εi,t
(1.7)
The consensus is defined as the average of all the other analyst forecasts for firm j
within the past 90 days to the point of earning forecast by analyst i for firm j at time t.
A negative(positive) value of RFE indicates that the analysts revised forecast is more(less)
accurate than the consensus forecast. The column 2 of Table 3 and Column 2 of Table
4 reports the results for the RA. The coefficients of LME are negative with a result of -
0.0183 and -0.00774, respectively. They are both significant with a t-value of -2.31 and
-2.07, respectively. The results indicate that ”LME” strategy give analysts a lower relative
forecast error and analysts with last minute revision strategy have a lower relative forecast
error than analyst who do not have. Combining the results of Table 3 and Table 4, I find that
analysts are taking the ”LME” strategy as a strategy because they have a higher accuracy
during the 1-5 calendar days before earnings announcement. Considering the results from
Table 2 that analysts with a higher accuracy in the previous quarter are more likely to
apply last minute revision strategy in the next quarter, the high accuracy during the specific
period before firm’s earnings announcement is a salient and simple signal by analysts to
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attract investor’s eyeballs.
1.4.6 Investor attention to the forecast by last minute earning
forecast revision analysts
To test whether there is higher attention paid to the analysts who revise their earning forecast
1-7 calendar days before the firm’s earnings announcement. I calculate 2-day abnormal size-
adjusted return, CARi,j,0−1 for analyst’s earning forecast revision. The forecasts made 1 day
before firm’s earnings announcement date are deleted from my sample because their 2-day
abnormal return would include the CAR for firm’s earnings announcement date, which would
contaminate the CAR generated by analysts. I use the model by Hugon and Muslu (2010).
CARi,j,t =αj,t + Two− Tonguei,j,t ∗Revi,j,t + Two− Tonguei,j,t +Revi,j,t
+ AbsRevi,j,t + LogSizej, t− 1 +BMj,t−1 + Lossj,t+
Brokersizei,t−1 + Frequencyi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1+
Firm− Experiencei,j,t + LogSizej, t− 1 ∗Revi,j,t+
BMj,t−1 ∗Revi,j,t + Lossj,t ∗Revi,j,t +Brokersizei,t−1 ∗Revi,j,t+
Frequencyi,t−1 ∗Revi,j,t +Breadthi,t−1 ∗Revi,j,t+
Firm− Experiencei,j,t ∗Revi,j,t + εi,j,t
(1.8)
The results of Table 5 show that the coefficient of the interaction variable of LME and
Revision is 0.147 with a significant t-value of 3.58. The market reaction is higher when
analyst issues their forecast within a LME timing period (1-7 calendar days before firm’s
earnings announcement). Market is going to react more positively when the analyst’s forecast
is higher than consensus and more negatively when the analyst’s forecast is lower than the
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consensus. This confirms my previous argument that analyst is issuing their forecasts 1-7
calendar days before firm’s earnings announcement date, the investors would pay higher
attention than other times.
1.4.7 Check the career path of these last minute earning forecast
analysts
If an analyst uses the last minute revision strategy to attract investors’ eyeballs, this strategy
should be a strategy that would influence their career path. One potential reason for analysts
to play this instantaneously verified last minute revision game may be these analysts are
eager to build or main their good reputation. Good reputation would be extremely helpful
for analysts’ future career path. Table 5 reports the results for the influence of ”LME”
on analysts career path. I use 5 different measurements to measure the career path of an
analyst. Stayup is a variable I take from Kini et al. (2009), when an analyst is promoted
to a brokerage house that is larger in the number of analysts of that firm or stay in the
same firm, the analyst is defined to have a status of stayup. Demotion is another variable
from Ke and Yu (2006), when an analyst is demoted from a brokerage house that has more
than 25 analysts to brokerage house that has less than 25 analysts, the analyst is defined
to be demotion. Exittop is a variable to measure analysts career path from Hilary and Hsu
(2013), when an analyst is demoted from a top 10 brokerage house to a non-top 10 brokerage
house, the analyst is defined to be Exittop. Movetop is defined to be equal to 1 when an
analyst is promoted from a non top 10 brokerage house to a top 10 brokerage house or
stay in the top 10 brokerage house. All-star analyst is defined to be equal to 1 when an
analyst is named as All-American analyst by the magazine Institutional Investor. In the
5 measurements, Movetop and Allstar measurement are the well accepted and efficient to
measure the promotion for an analysts career path. The Stayup, Demo and Exittop is also
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used by previous literature, but moving to a smaller brokerage house or staying in the same
brokerage house could not clearly picture the career demotion or promotion of an analyst.
I use all these 5 measurements in order to see the influence of investor attention on the
analysts career path from different views. The empirical model I use to measure the career
path of an analyst is as follows:
Stayupi,t =LMEi,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1
+ Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(1.9)
Demoi,t =LMEi,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1
+ Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(1.10)
Exittopi,t =LMEi,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1
+ Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(1.11)
Movetopi,t =LMEi,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1
+ Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(1.12)
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Allstari,t =LMEi,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1
+ Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(1.13)
The coefficient of last minute revision is 0.269, 0.128 and 0.229 in column 1, column 4
and column 5 in Table 5, respectively. The z-statistics of the coefficient is 6.5, 5.88 and 6.43,
respectively. The results indicate that the last minute revision is helpful for analysts to get
promoted to a larger brokerage firm, a top 10 brokerage firm and all-American analyst. The
sign of the coefficient of last minute revision is -0.373 and -0.29 respectively in column 2
and column 3. These results prove the last minute revision strategy is protecting analysts
from being demoted to a smaller brokerage firm and exit the top 10 brokerage firm. The
last minute revision strategy is proved to be helpful for analysts in their career path.
1.4.8 Different Influence between Star and Non-Star
The results insight me that the last minute revision could help analysts to get promoted and
keep them away from being demoted in their career path. However, the results also bring
another question, if doing this last minute revision game is really helpful for analysts, then
why I do not see every analyst come and join this game? The last minute earning forecast
revision only takes a small portion of all analyst forecasts. One possible explanation may
be even if it is a good time that investor attention is centered on the firm, but in that 1-7
days period, the street consensus on the firm is almost settled down. How can an analyst
convince the investors that their forecasts are more valuable than the street consensus? In
other words, what kinds of analysts’ words are really trustful and influential during this
period of time when it is only a few days to the firm public earnings announcements. Fang
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and Yasuda (2013) research may be helpful to answer this question, they find that the all star
analyst opinions worth more than the non-star analysts. Table 7 reports the results in total
number of the last minute revision strategy for analysts in their whole career. The average
number of last minute revision strategy for non-star analyst is about 6.6, while the average
number for all-star analyst is about 16.7, the difference in the number of last minute revision
strategy between star and non-star analyst is both statistical significant with a t-value of
-27.3 and economic significant with a difference of 10. Linking the results from Table 2 that
all star analysts are more likely to play this last minute revision game than non all-star
analysts, the answer to the small portion LME is clear, existing reputation of an analyst
could have different influence on analysts’ career. To explore the different influence of last
minute revision strategy on all-star analyst and non-star analyst, I do the following tests.
The empirical model to check the career path difference between the non-star analyst and
all-star analyst is as follows:
Stayupi,t =LME − Allstari,t−1 + LME −Non− Allstari,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1+
Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1 + Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(1.14)
Demoi,t =LME − Allstari,t−1 + LME −Non− Allstari,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1+
Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1 + Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(1.15)
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Exittopi,t =LME − Allstari,t−1 + LME −Non− Allstari,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1+
Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1 + Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(1.16)
Movetopi,t =LME − Allstari,t−1 + LME −Non− Allstari,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1+
Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1 + Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(1.17)
Allstari,t =LME − Allstari,t−1 + LME −Non− Allstari,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1+
Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1 + Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(1.18)
LME-Allstar is defined to be equal to 1 if an analyst is an all-star analyst and he or she
has at least 1 last minute revision in the previous year, 0 otherwise. LME-Non-Allstar is
defined to be equal to 1 if an analyst is an non all-star analyst and he or she has at least 1
last minute revision in the previous year, 0 otherwise.
Table 7 shows the results of the different influence of ”LME” strategy on star-analysts
and non-star analysts. The coefficient of LME-Non-Allstar Column 4 and Column 5 is -
0.131 and -1.253 respectively. The z-statistics of the two coefficients are -5.05 and -23.71
respectively. While the coefficient of LME-Allstar is 1.88 and 3.346 respectively. The t-value
of the two coefficients are 39.8 and 54.97, respectively. The results prove that the all-star
analysts who have the last minute revision behavior are more likely to be moved or stayed in
a top 10 brokerage house and they are also more likely to be nominated as an all-star analyst
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in the next year. Compared with the all-star analysts, the non-star analyst who have the
last minute revision behavior in the previous year are less likely to be promoted or stayed in
a top 10 brokerage house and less likely to become an all-star analyst in the next year. The
results are telling a clear story what is happening in this last minute revision game. All-star
analyst could really grab the investors’ attention and get the benefit of playing this game.
While for the non-star analysts, playing this risky last minute revision game would actually
hurt them. The cost of playing this game explains why there are not a lot of analysts trying
to play this last minute revision game even if the last minute revision strategy seems to be
beneficial for them in their career path. After all, all-star analysts are a small group of people
in each industry. The results also explain the huge difference in the number of last minute
revision strategy between the star-analyst and non-star-analyst. Combing the results from
Table 2, Table 6 and Table 7, I get the conclusion that the last minute revision strategy is
a strategy applied by analysts to maintain their existing reputation.
1.5 Robustness test to solve the endogeneity
A possible concern in my results for the career path of analyst may be that there is an
endogeneity problem among the analysts who apply the ”LME” strategy. As I have showed,
it is the all-star analysts who are more likely to play this game. Guttman (2011) also proves
that analysts who are more likely to issue later forecasts revision are analysts with high
learning abilities. It is quite possible that it is the high quality of the analysts instead of
their ”LME” strategy are helping these analysts to get promoted and nominated to be all-
American analysts. To solve this potential problem, I apply a method by Wooldrige, which
is from his book of Econometrics. First, I need to create an instrumental variable which is
closely related to the variable of last minute revision and not correlated with the variables I
apply to measure the analyst career path. One instrumental variable that could be applied
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is called Imitate. This variable is a binary variable which is equal to 0 if the LME from an
analysts is not the first one for the same firm. If an last minute revision behavior is not
the first within the 1-7 calendar days for a firm, then the analysts who revise their forecasts
are defined to imitate the first analyst in taking the strategy. This variable is very closely
related with my last minute revision variable, but totally independent from the promotion
or demotion variable. I apply this instrumental variable to do the two-stage regression
endogeneity checking procedure to test if there is endogeneity problem in my regression
model. In the first stage regression, I use the last minute revision as the dependent variable
and regress it on my instrumental variable and the other control variables. The following is
the first-step regression model:
Step 1:
LMEi,t−1 =Inducei,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1+
Logfollowi,t−1 + Experiencei,t−1 + epsiloni,t−1
(1.19)
I get the residuals from the above regression model and then input the residual into the
regression model in step2 as following:
Step 2:
Stayupi,t =LMEi,t−1 +Residualsi,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1+
Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1 + Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(1.20)
Demoi,t =LMEi,t−1 +Residualsi,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1+
Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1 + Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(1.21)
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Exittopi,t =LMEi,t−1 +Residualsi,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1+
Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1 + Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(1.22)
Movetopi,t =LMEi,t−1 +Residualsi,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1+
Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1 + Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(1.23)
Allstari,t =LMEi,t−1 +Residualsi,t−1 + Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1+
Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1 + Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(1.24)
Table 9 shows the results of robustness tests. The coefficients of the LME in column 4 and
column 5 are 0.516 and 0.723, respectively. Both of these coefficient remain significant with
a z-statistics of 7.16 and 6.35, respectively. The results of the logistic regression results in
the Table 9 show that for the last two measurements of an analysts career path, the movetop
and the all-star, there is no endogeneity issue. While for the stayup, demo and exittop, there
is some endogeneity issue because the coefficient of LME are not significant in the Column
1, Column 2 and Column 3. This results are not surprising, the three measurements of
Stayup, Demo and Exittop are relatively weak measurements compared with the Movetop
and Allstar. The empirical results from Table 9 solve the concern of endogeneity and prove
the last minute revision strategy is a good strategy to maintain an analyst’s reputation,
which would be helpful for his or her career path.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper explores the last minute earning forecast revision strategy applied by security
analysts to attract the attention of investors within the seven day period immediately preced-
ing firm’s earnings announcement. Those analysts applying the LME strategy have a higher
accuracy in forecasting a firm earnings. Moreover, compared with the non-star analysts, the
all-star analysts are more likely to adopt the last minute earning forecast revision strategy.
By comparing the different influence on analyst career paths of the ”LME” strategy between
all-star analysts and non-star analysts, the conclusion is reached that the all-star analysts
may use the last minute revision strategy to maintain their good reputation and thus help
them to get on a better career path by making themselves more likely to get promoted to a
top 10 brokerage house and more likely to be continuously nominated as an all-American an-
alyst. However, when non-star analysts adopt the last minute revision strategy, it is hurtful
to them. The results are robust after control for the endogeneity problem.
The results in this paper are insightful for the study of security analyst behavior and
strategy. The strategy taken by security analysts to catch the investors eyeballs are also
intuitive for the study in investor attention behavior. Investor limited attention make in-
vestors overly rely on the salient features of financial analyst reports. While the ”last minute
earning forecast revision” strategy by security analysts could make analysts to be salient by
standing out in the last seven calendar days before a firm earnings announcement, when in-
vestor attention are highly centered around the firm. I show the truth that catching investor
attention could maintain the analyst reputation and help them to get a better career, but
this only works for the all-star analysts. The results could also help investors to identify the
voice within the last 7 calendar days when they are looking are all the possible information
of the earnings announcement firm. The forecast made within this period is noteworthy
because of its high accuracy, especially relative to previous analyst reports.
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1.7 Tables
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics. This table presents the summary statistics of the whole
sample in my analysis. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for analyst forecasts in a
firm-quarter-analyst level.This table presents the summary statistics of the whole sample in
my analysis. The sample consists of all the analyst EPS forecasts in I/B/E/S from 1994 to
2012. The stock return is from CRSP daily data. Panle A presents the descriptive statistics
for analyst forecasts in a firm-quarter-analyst level. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics
for earnings forecast in a analyst-quarter level. Panel C gives the summary statistics in a
analyst-year level.
Panel A
count mean sd min p50 max
Accuracy 179411 0.497 0.173 0 0.500 1
RFE 179411 -0.00302 0.626 -118.0 -0.000712 69.10
Accuracyi,t−1 179411 0.500 0.176 0 0.500 1
Boldness 179411 0.503 0.165 0 0.500 1
Breadth 179411 0.527 0.279 0.0546 0.538 1
LnFollow 179411 2.251 0.546 0.693 2.303 4.190
Firm-Experience 179411 0.467 0.239 0 0.483 1
Gap 179411 0.496 0.206 0 0.500 1
Observations 179411
Panel B
count mean sd min p50 max
LME 1245894 0.0379 0.191 0 0 1
Accuracy 1245894 0.500 0.315 0 0.500 1
RFE 1245894 -0.00605 1.607 -777.9 0 483.7
Accuracyi,j,t−1 1245894 0.503 0.314 0 0.500 1
Boldness 1245894 0.500 0.310 0 0.500 1
LnFollow 1245894 2.252 0.704 0.693 2.303 4.190
Breadth 1245894 0.504 0.330 0 0.500 1
Firm Experience 1245894 0.501 0.308 0 0.500 1
Gap 1245894 0.506 0.316 0 0.501 1
Observations 1245894
Panel C
count mean sd min p50 max
Stayup 49787 0.941 0.237 0 1 1
Demo 49787 0.0240 0.153 0 0 1
Exittop 49787 0.0179 0.133 0 0 1
Allstar 49787 0.0961 0.295 0 0 1
Imitate 49787 0.0908 0.245 0 0 1
AG 49787 0.520 0.500 0 1 1
Accuracy 49787 0.499 0.136 0 0.502 1
Boldness 49787 0.505 0.129 0 0.500 1
Breadth 49787 0.504 0.277 0.001 0.562 1
Follow 49787 2.495 0.558 0 2.565 4.060
Experience 49787 1.249 0.852 0 1.386 2.944
Observations 49787
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Table 1.2: Logistic Regression. This table shows the results of the analysts’ characteristics
that may influence the analysts’ probability of taking the last minute earning forecast revision
strategy.Allstari,t is a dummy variable that equals to be 1 if analyst i is nominated by the
magazine Institutional Investor to be an All-American analyst in his or her industry in year
t. Accuracyi,j,t is the standardized earnings forecast ranking of analyst i relative to other
analysts follow firm j in quarter t. LMEi,j,tis also a dummy variable if analyst applies the
last minute earning forecast revision strategy for firm j in quarter t. Boldnessi,j,t is the
ranking result of the difference of quarterly earnings forecast by analyst i relative to the
consensus for the firm j in quarter t. Firm−Experiencei,j,t is the total number of quarters
analyst i follows firm j until t. LnFollowi,j,t is the log total number of analysts following firm
j in quarter t. Gapi,j,t is the difference on calendar days between the public announcement
date for firm j and the last earning forecast date of analyst i in quarter t. Breadthi,t is the




























t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.3: OLS Regression. This table presents the results of analyst’s accuracy for the last
minute earning forecast revision strategy in a firm-quarter-analyst level. Accuracyi,j,t is the
standardized earnings forecast ranking of analyst i relative to other analysts follow firm j in
quarter t. RAi,j,t is defined in Section 4. LMEi,j,tis also a dummy variable if analyst applies
the last minute earning forecast revision strategy for firm j in quarter t. Boldnessi,j,t is the
ranking result of the difference of analyst quarterly earnings forecast by analyst i relative
to the consensus for the firm j in quarter t. Firm − Experiencei,j,t is the total number of
quarters analyst i follows firm j until t. LnFollowi,j,t is the log total number of analysts
following firm j in quarter t. Gapi,j,t is the difference on calendar days between the public
announcement date for firm j and the last earning forecast date of analyst i in quarter t.























t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.4: OLS Regression. This table presents the results of analyst’s accuracy for the last
minute earning forecast revision strategy in a quarter-analyst level. Accuracyi,t is the average
of standardized earnings forecast ranking of analyst i relative to other analysts follow firm j
in quarter t. RAi,t is average of RAi,j,t across all firms in quarter t for analyst i. LMEi,t is
the average of of LMEi,j,t across all firms in quarter t for analyst i.Boldnessi,t is the average
Boldnessi,j,t for analyst i across all firms in quarter t. Firm−Experiencei,t is the average of
Firm−Experiencei,j,t across all firms for analyst i in quarter t. LnFollowi,t is the average
of LnFollowi,j,t across all firms for analyst i in quarter t. Gapi,t is the average of Gapi,j,t

























t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: OLS Regression. This table presents the results for the market reaction to
analysts’ earnings forecast when they apply the ”LME” strategy.Revi,j,t is earnings fore-
cast revision of analyst i, calculated as forecast by analyst i at year t for firm j minus
the mean consensus forecast for firm j scaled by the most recent preceding monthly stock
price.AbsRevi,j,t is the absolute value of earnings forecast revision by analyst i. Lossi,j,t is
dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has negative earnings in quarter t, otherwise 0.Sizej,t−1
is defined as the market capitalization at the beginning of year t. BMj,t−1 is book to market
ratio, calculated as Compustat annual item CEQ divided by firm size at the end of year t-1.
Firm − Experiencei,j,t is a the number of years analyst i has covered firm j until year t.
BrokerSizei,t is defined as the log of the number of analysts hired by the brokerage firm of
analyst i at the end of year t-1. Freqi,t is the total number of earnings forecasts made by
analyst i in year t. Breadthi,t is the number of firms analyst i covered in year t.
(1) (2)
CARi,j,t CARi,j,t

























Firm − Experiencei,j,t 0.000269∗ 0.000287∗
(1.70) (1.82)
LogSizej,t−1 ∗ Revi,j,t 0.0186∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗
(3.21) (2.81)
BMj,t−1 ∗ Revi,j,t -0.0249∗∗∗ -0.0245∗∗∗
(-5.31) (-5.21)
Lossj,t ∗ Revi,j,t -0.150∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗
(-11.13) (-11.35)
LogBrokersizei,t−1 ∗ Revi,j,t 0.0151∗∗∗ 0.0170∗∗∗
(2.61) (2.91)
Freqi,t−1 ∗ Revi,j,t -0.0615∗∗∗ -0.0592∗∗∗
(-5.26) (-5.06)
Breadthi,t ∗ Revi,j,t -0.00230∗∗∗ -0.00244∗∗∗
(-3.38) (-3.58)
Firm − Experiencei,j,t ∗ Revi,j,t 0.114∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(11.69) (11.76)
N 779237 779237
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Logistic Regression. This table reports the influence of last minute earning
forecast revision strategy on analysts’ career path. Stayupi,t is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 if analyst i is promoted to a larger brokerage house or stay in the same brokerage
house in year t. Demoi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i is demoted from
a brokerage house that has more than 25 analysts to a smaller brokerage house that has
less than 25 analysts in year t. Exittopi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst
i leaves a top 10 brokerage house in year t. Movetopi,t is a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 if analyst i moves from a non top 10 brokerage house into a top 10 brokerage house in
year t. Allstari,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i is nominated to be an
All-American analyst by the magazine Institutional Investor in year t. Accuracyi,t is average
of Accuracyi,j,t across all firms in year t for analyst i. LMEi,t is the average of of LMEi,j,t
across all firms in year t for analyst i. Boldnessi,t is the average Boldnessi,j,t for analyst i
across all firms in year t. Firm Experiencei,t is the average of Firm−Experiencei,j,t across
all firms for analyst i in year t. LnFollowi,t is the average of LnFollowi,j,t across all firms
for analyst i in year t. Breadthi,t is the number of firms analyst i covered in year t.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stayupi,t Demoi,t Exittopi,t Movetopi,t Allstari,t
main
LMEi,t−1 0.269
∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(6.50) (-5.84) (-3.93) (5.88) (6.43)
Accuracyi,t−1 0.544
∗∗∗ -0.662∗∗∗ -0.933∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗ 1.699∗∗∗
(3.92) (-3.02) (-3.71) (6.16) (8.85)
Boldnessi,t−1 -0.165 0.128 -0.0578 -0.123 0.0863
(-1.13) (0.56) (-0.22) (-1.51) (0.44)
Breadthi,t−1 0.282
∗∗∗ -0.144 -0.323∗∗ -0.0815∗ 1.770∗∗∗
(3.35) (-1.12) (-2.17) (-1.81) (22.21)
LnFollowi,t−1 -0.129
∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 1.205∗∗∗
(-3.59) (4.94) (5.55) (21.90) (29.15)
Experiencei,t−1 -0.148
∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗ 1.320∗∗∗
(-5.21) (2.62) (2.74) (1.99) (35.10)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 49755 49755 49755 49755 49755
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Difference in number of last minute earning forecast revision between Star and
Non-Star Analysts. This table reports the difference in the number of last minute earning
forecast revision strategy between Star analysts and Non-Star analysts, the number is the
total number of last minute earning forecast revision in an analyst’s whole career path. I
count the number of the last minute earning forecast revision strategy from the time when
an analyst is recorded in I/B/E/S until the analyst is disappeared in I/B/E/S.
Star VS Non star in the number of LME
Group Obs Mean sd T-Value
Non-Star 7300 6.618356 9.165202
Star 1085 16.67834 20.67765
Total 8385 7.920095 11.8243
Difference -10.05998 t = -27.2831
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Table 1.8: Logistic Regression This table reports the different influence of last minute earning
forecast revision strategy on analysts’ career path between star-analyst and non-star analyst.
Stayupi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i is promoted to a larger brokerage
house or stay in the same brokerage house in year t. Demoi,t is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 if analyst i is demoted from a brokerage house that has more than 25 analysts to
a smaller brokerage house that has less than 25 analysts in year t. Exittopi,t is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i leaves a top 10 brokerage house in year t. Movetopi,t is
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i moves from a non top 10 brokerage house into
a top 10 brokerage house in year t. Allstari,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst
i is nominated to be an All-American analyst by the magazine Institutional Investor in year
t. Accuracyi,t is average of Accuracyi,j,t across all firms in year t for analyst i. LMEi,t is
the average of of LMEi,j,t across all firms in year t for analyst i. . Boldnessi,t is the average
Boldnessi,j,t for analyst i across all firms in year t. Firm − Experiencei,t is the average of
Firm− Experiencei,j,t across all firms for analyst i in year t. LnFollowi,t is the average of
LnFollowi,j,t across all firms for analyst i in year t. Breadthi,t is the number of firms analyst
i covered in year t.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stayupi,t Demotioni,t Exittopi,t Movetopi,t Allstari,t
main
Non− Star − LMEi,t−1 0.160∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -1.253∗∗∗
(3.13) (-2.23) (-3.02) (-5.03) (-23.71)
Star − LMEi,t−1 0.294∗∗∗ -0.523∗∗∗ -0.0682 1.880∗∗∗ 3.346∗∗∗
(2.94) (-3.00) (-0.42) (39.80) (54.97)
Accuracyi,t−1 0.797
∗∗∗ -0.872∗∗ -1.619∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 1.373∗∗∗
(3.54) (-2.34) (-3.96) (4.04) (5.40)
Boldnessi,t−1 0.242 -0.220 -0.708
∗ -0.148 -0.0259
(1.05) (-0.58) (-1.71) (-1.23) (-0.10)
Breadthi,t−1 0.136 -0.00829 -0.114 -0.144
∗∗∗ 1.431∗∗∗
(1.32) (-0.05) (-0.61) (-2.73) (13.95)
Lnfollowi,t−1 -0.251
∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 1.123∗∗∗
(-5.14) (5.84) (5.83) (16.99) (20.37)
Experiencei,t−1 -0.00202 -0.0334 -0.0983 -0.0826
∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗
(-0.04) (-0.46) (-1.18) (-3.61) (17.85)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 49787 49787 49787 49787 49787
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Robustness Test-Step 1. This table shows the robustness test results for Step 1.
Imitatei,t is the instrumental variable I apply in Step 1, it is defined in detail in Section 6.
Accuracyi,t is average of Accuracyi,j,t across all firms in year t for analyst i. LMEi,t is the
average of of LMEi,j,t across all firms in year t for analyst i. . Boldnessi,t is the average
Boldnessi,j,t for analyst i across all firms in year t. Firm − Experiencei,t is the average of
Firm− Experiencei,j,t across all firms for analyst i in year t. LnFollowi,t is the average of
LnFollowi,j,t across all firms for analyst i in year t. Breadthi,t is the number of firms analyst






















t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.10: Robustness Test-Step 2. This table shows the robustness test results for Step
2. Residuali,t is the residuals I get from the Step 1 in Table 8. Stayupi,t is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i is promoted to a larger brokerage house or stay in the
same brokerage house in year t. Demoi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i is
demoted from a brokerage house that has more than 25 analysts to a smaller brokerage house
that has less than 25 analysts in year t. Exittopi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if
analyst i leaves a top 10 brokerage house in year t. Movetopi,t is a dummy variable that is
equal to 1 if analyst i moves from a non top 10 brokerage house into a top 10 brokerage house
in year t. Allstari,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i is nominated to be an
All-American analyst by the magazine Institutional Investor in year t. Accuracyi,t is average
of Accuracyi,j,t across all firms in year t for analyst i. LMEi,t is the average of of LMEi,j,t
across all firms in year t for analyst i. . Boldnessi,t is the average Boldnessi,j,t for analyst
i across all firms in year t. Firm − Experiencei,t is the average of Firm − Experiencei,j,t
across all firms for analyst i in year t. LnFollowi,t is the average of LnFollowi,j,t across all
firms for analyst i in year t. Breadthi,t is the number of firms analyst i covered in year t.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stayupi,t Demoi,t Exittopi,t Movetopi,t Allstari,t
main
LMEi,t−1 0.190 -0.149 0.194 0.516
∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗
(1.28) (-0.67) (0.80) (7.16) (6.35)
Residuali,t−1 0.0856 -0.245 -0.533
∗ -0.424∗∗∗ -0.533∗∗∗
(0.55) (-1.04) (-2.08) (-5.64) (-4.55)
Accuracyi,t−1 0.562
∗∗∗ -0.713∗∗ -1.044∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 1.575∗∗∗
(3.94) (-3.18) (-4.05) (4.94) (8.12)
Boldnessi,t−1 -0.158 0.108 -0.103 -0.159 0.0388
(-1.08) (0.47) (-0.40) (-1.93) (0.20)
Breadthi,t−1 0.332
∗∗ -0.289 -0.637∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗ 1.455∗∗∗
(2.68) (-1.52) (-3.00) (-5.24) (13.81)
Followi,t−1 -0.130
∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗∗ 1.204∗∗∗
(-3.60) (4.97) (5.61) (21.92) (29.11)
Experiencei,t−1 -0.149
∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.0323∗ 1.336∗∗∗
(-5.21) (2.63) (2.77) (2.11) (35.22)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 49787 49787 49787 49787 49787
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Chapter 2
Security Analysts’ Double Down
Behavior in Stock Recommendation
2.1 Introduction
Financial analysts play an important role in today’s financial market. Analysts produce two im-
portant output for investors, earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. For investors, it is
important to understand why analysts make certain forecasts and recommendations. Meanwhile,
financial analysts have public research outputs, and these outputs can be measured easily by the
investor community and researchers in general. Hence I can study financial analysts to gauge how
individuals’ behavioral biases can impact the career outcome.
In this paper, I study analysts’ doubling down behavior. In investing, ”doubling down” refers
to someone increases the investment position after initial loss on the position. For example, hedge
fund managers normally buy stocks when they believe these stocks are undervalued. If, after the
purchase, the stocks experience a significant in price, how would these managers react? One re-
sponse is to double down, buying more of the same stocks at the current (lower) prices. Rhinesmith
(2014) find out that the managers who double down stocks on positions that have run against them
tend to outperform the other managers. He presents empirical evidence and shows that managers
35
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who invest more in the ”dropped down” (stock price are experiencing a significant drop) stocks
perform better than the managers who sell the dropped down stocks after controlling for the other
effects.
If a stock that an analyst previously believes to be a good stock (recommended buy or strong
buy) is experiencing a significant drop in the stock price, the analyst may downgrade the stock or
drop the coverage of the stock altogether. On the other hand, the analyst can reiterate the same
favorable recommendation of the stock or even upgrade the stock. This is the double down behavior
I consider in this paper. There are two possible reasons for analyst to upgrade or maintain the
position for a dropped down stock. One possible reason may be that the analyst is trying to defend
the firm by establishing a good relationship with the firm’s management. The better relationship
with the management may enable the analyst to produce more accurate earnings forecasts, or to
help winning investment banking business. The other possible reason for the upgrade is that the
analyst believes the dropped down stock is still undervalued even after the stock has experienced
a significant drop in the stock price. That is, the analyst is still confident in his or her previous
judgment about the stock and insists to maintain or even upgrade his or her previous position about
the stock. In this paper, I attempt to answer the following questions: Do analysts double down?
How do investors react to the double type type recommendation? Are these recommendations
useful to investors? What motivates analysts to double down?
I find that some analysts double down. To explore the reasons for security analysts’ double
down behavior. I first test the forecast accuracy for the security analyst in the next year after their
double down behavior in the current year. I do not find any evidence on the effect of analyst’s
double down behavior on the analysts’ forecast accuracy. This result indicates that when an analyst
recommends a dropped down stock, he or she does not gain an advantage in forecast accuracy. To
find out whether the analysts’ double down recommendations are good or bad investment advice, I
check the short-run abnormal return and the long-run abnormal return of these stocks after these
recommendations. I find stocks with “double down” recommendations have a significant negative
abnormal return compared with the other stocks with positive recommendations. This results
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present evidence that the “double down” recommendations may be suboptimal advices from the
analysts.
To further explore the double down behavior, I design a logistic regression to figure out what
kinds of analysts are more likely to have the double down behavior and what kinds of analysts are
less likely to have the double down behavior. I find All-American analysts are less likely to have this
”double down” behavior. Analysts who have a ”double down” behavior in the previous year are
more likely to have a double down behavior in the next year. Analyst forecast accuracy, boldness,
horizon do not have significant effect on analyst’s double down behavior. I also show that analysts
tend to have the double down behavior early in their careers. As their careers progress, they tend
to be less likely to have the double down behavior. The double down behavior shows a time-series
pattern. Most analysts who used to have double down behavior do not have the second time of
behaving the double down behavior. In other words, about three quarters of analysts only have
double down behavior once in their whole career path. The double down behavior hurts analysts in
their career development. Analysts who have double down behavior in current year are more likely
to be demoted to a smaller brokerage firm, less likely to be promoted to a larger brokerage firm
and less likely to become an All-American analyst in the next year. This result is consistent with
the results that most analysts only have one time of double down behavior in their career path. It
also explains why All-American analysts are less likely to have the double down behavior.
Following (Rhinesmith, 2014), I also apply the Fama-French 4 factors model to check whether
the analysts who used to have double down behavior underperform those who never have double
down behavior. Using the method of /citeFang2013a, I follow the buy recommendation and sell
recommendation of the double down analysts and never-double-down analysts. I find that the
double down analysts have a lower alpha when they upgrade stocks than non-double down analysts.
The double down analysts have a less negative alpha when they downgrade stocks than non-double
down analysts. This results indicate the double-down analysts is having a less positive market
reaction when they upgrade a stock and a more negative market reaction when they downgrade a
stock. The negative impact of the double down behavior to analysts is not only reflected in their
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career development but also reflected in the market reaction when they upgrade stocks.
This paper contributes to the literature related with analyst recommendation bias in two as-
pects. First, previous literature on analyst recommendation bias is focus on analyst’s external
source such as analyst’s brokerage affiliation, analyst’s relationship with hedge fund and analyst’s
relationship with firm’s management. I point out the analyst recommendation bias is also related
with analyst themselves. Security analysts suppose to be more rational than individual investors,
but they can not avoid suffering from overconfidence, which makes them make bad moves. Second,
taking the risk to double down the stocks in hedge fund industry is helpful for the fund managers
to become a star, while the double down behavior is hurting analyst in their career development
and lowering the influential power of security analysts. This negative impact to security analyst
indicates the risk of taking a overconfident move in the analyst industry may not be a good choice
for young analysts. My research could also help investors to identify the potential overly opti-
mistic biased recommendation and avoid following these biased recommendations to make their
investment decisions. Before an investor make the decision to long a dropped down stock just get
upgraded by security analyst, they should review the analyst’s previous position on the same stock
to make a conservative move instead of an aggressive long investment.
2.2 Literature Review
Previous research has done a lot of work on analysts’ recommendation bias. Hong and Kacperczyk
(2010) prove that competition among analysts could lead to optimistic bias recommendation be-
cause of the conflict of interests. Loh and Mian (2006) find that analysts who give more accurate
earnings forecast could also issue more profitable stock recommendations. Ertimur et al. (2007)
presents similar evidence that more accurate analysts make more profitable recommendations even
after controlling for their expertise. Firth et al. (2013) show evidence that mutual relationship could
bias analyst’s recommendation. They find analysts’ recommendation on a stock is relatively higher
compared with consensus when the stock is held by the mutual fund clients of analysts’ brokerage
firm. Michaely (1999) hold the same opinion by showing the results that underwriter analysts buy
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recommendations perform worse than that of the unaffiliated analysts. They also find that market
does not recognize this bias inside the affiliated analysts. Jegadeesh et al. (2004) present empirical
results that higher consensus recommendation are associated with worse subsequent returns if the
high recommended stocks are stocks with low value or low negative momentum returns. Lin and
McNichols (1998) argue that recommendations from lead analysts could be optimistic biased by
presenting the indicated evidence that investors expect lead analysts are more likely to recommend
”Hold” when ”Sell” is warranted.
But not all the research agree with the idea that bias recommendations are common during
security analysts. Clarke et al. (2006) find the market does not view upgrade recommendation
issued by affiliated security analysts as biased since there is no price reversal following the upgrade
of these recommendations.
Besides the bias recommendation research, some research also explore the relationship between
stock recommendation and market reaction. For example, Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006)
provide a link between analysts’ stock recommendation update and stock market return by showing
their empirical results.
All the research are focus on the analyst’s external characteristics, such as analyst affiliation
or analyst’s brokerage house effect. To my best knowledge, there is little research on analyst’s
internal characteristics’ effect on their recommendation bias. Since analysts are still human beings,
so human being’s emotional characteristics such as overconfidence could have a effect on analyst’s
behavior. My paper is intended to fill this gap in analysts’ recommendation bias area by showing
the effect of the ”double down” behavior on analyst’s recommendation bias.
2.3 Data
I get analyst’s recommendation data from the I/B/E/S Detail Recommendations file from 1994 to
2014. I start my sample period from 1994 because the I/B/E/S’s recommendations file cover the
period started from late in 1993. The recommendation rating system in I/B/E/S is from 1(strong
buy) to 5 (sell). So all the analysts’ recommendation ratings in my sample is from 1 to 5. The
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upgrade and downgrade of analysts’ rating is also based on this rating system. Then my main
sample includes all the public firms in the three main exchanges, NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq.
Analyst employment information (analyst brokerage house) is also obtained from the I/B/E/S
detail history file by reviewing an analyst brokerage firm. Accounting data comes from Compustat
annual data and stock return is from CRSP daily data.
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Define ”Double Down”
The double down strategy is defined in the following way: First, I calculate the difference be-
tween the current recommendation and the previous recommendation. If an analyst’s previous
recommendation is 1 or 2, the analyst’s current recommendation on the same stock is 1 or 2 and
current recommendation has a higher or equal level than the previous recommendation. Then the
current recommendation is named an indicator variable to be ”Up” and equal to be 1, otherwise
0. Second, I calculate the cumulative market size-adjusted return from 2 days after the previous
recommendation until 2 days before the current new recommendation. This cumulative return is
named to be CAR. Third, I also care about the distance between the current recommendation and
the previous recommendation. The distance is the number of calendar days between the current
recommendation and the previous recommendation.
If Up=1 and CAR<-30% and 0<distance<365, then a recommendation would be defined to
be ”Loseup” and equal to be 1, which means analyst shows double down behavior by upgrading a
stock recommendation even if stock is experiencing a significant drop in stock price, otherwise 0.
If Up=1 and CAR>30% and 0<distance<365, then a recommendation would be defined to be
”Winup” and equal to be 1, which means analyst upgrades a stock that is experiencing a significant
increase in the stock price, otherwise 0.
The upgrade is to make sure the analyst is upgrading the stock. The limitation on the stock
recommendation level for the current and the previous to be 1 or 2 is to guarantee analyst’s belief
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on the stock is ”good enough to long”. I limit the distance between two recommendations to be
less than 365 days because I want to avoid the problems generated by stale recommendations. If
the distance between two recommendations is too long, analysts barely care about or even forget
about his previous belief about the stock. The limitation about CAR is to make sure the stocks are
experiencing a significant increase or decrease in the price during the upgrade period for analyst’s
recommendation. I also try other measurement about CAR with 25% or 20%, a lower CAR could
give me more observations for loseup and winup, but does not change my results significantly.
2.4.2 Define control variables
Define the other control variables: All the control variables are ranked following a similar method
as that used in the previous literature to measure accuracy.I use the method of Hilary and Hsu
(2013) to build the control variable of accuracy, boldness, gap,firm experience and breadth.
Accuracyi,j,t = 1 − (ranki,j,t)/(number of analysts following firm j − 1) (2.1)
Boldness is the absolute value of the difference between the forecast by analyst i and the street
consensus following Ke and Yu (2006). The street consensus is defined as the average of all the
other analysts forecasts for firm j within the past 90 days to the point of the forecast by analyst i for
firm j at time t. Gap is defined as the total number of calendar days between the analyst forecast
date and the firm public announcement date following Clement and Tse (2003). Firm-Experience
is defined following Hong and Kubik (2003a), which is the log of the number of quarters the analyst
has covered the firm. Experience is the log of the number of years the analyst has in the I/B/E/S
following. Breadth is defined following Hong and Kubik (2003b), which is the number of firms that
the analyst gives forecast in a fiscal given year. Since I measure accuracy by rankings and to keep
the consistency, I also apply ranking variables for Boldness, Gap, Firm-Experience, Experience,
and Breadth.
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2.4.3 Description of the Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for my main variables. My sample includes 15888 analysts.
The total number of ”Loseup” analysts are 2423 and the amount of the ”Loseup” behavior is 4661.
I also present the total number of ”Winup” analysts, which is 2717. The amount of the ”Winup”
behavior is 5815. Table 1 also presents the frequency of the ”Loseup” behavior. About 56% of the
analysts only have one time ”Loseup” behavior in their whole career path. The number of analysts
who have more than 2 times of ”Losup” behavior in their career development only takes 20.76%.
This results indicate that most analysts stop having the second ”Loseup” behavior after they have
the first one.
The return by following the recommendation of ”Double Down” analysts
To test the performance of the stocks recommended by the double down analysts, I calculate the
long-run return of these stocks. Table 2 presents the results of the 60 days, 90 days and 180
days abnormal return by the double down analysts, winup analysts and the return of general stock
upgrade. The 60 days return is calculated from two days after the stock recommendation date until
62 days after the recommendation date. The 90 days and 180 days abnormal return is calculated by
the same way. The 60 days, 90 days and 180 days abnormal return of the stock recommended by the
double down analyst is -0.019, -0.037 and -0.076, respectively. The 60 days,, 90 days and 180 days
abnormal return from the general upgrade is 0.007, 0.009 and 0.012, respectively. We could easily
make the judgment that the performance of the stocks recommended by the double down analysts
is worse than the general level of upgrade recommendation. To compare with the performance of
the double down analysts, I also calculate the abnormal return of the winup analysts. The 60 days,
90 days and 180 days abnormal return of the stocks recommended by the winup analysts is 0.023,
0.030 and 0.049, respectively. The abnormal return from the winup analysts is positive and much
higher than that of the double down analysts. The difference between the abnormal return from the
double down analysts and winup analysts provide clear evidence that the upgrade recommendation
by double down analysts is biased.
CHAPTER 2. TWO 43
To confirm that the lower abnormal return is generated by the double down behavior instead
of other analyst or firm characteristics, I use the method of Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014).
CARj,t =Loseupi,j,t + +Persisti,j,t + LogSizej,t−1 +BMj,t−1 +Brokersizei,t−1+
Firm− Experiencei,j,t + εi,j,t
(2.2)
Persisti,j,t is defined following Mikhail et al. (2004) as the quintile rank of analysts based on
the excess returns by taking a long(short) position in their upward(downard) revisions associated
with their revisions for the previous one-year period. BrokerSizei,t is the number of analysts for
the brokerage firm of analyst i. Firm − Experiencei,j,t is a the number of years analyst i has
covered firm j until year t.Sizej,t−1 is firm size, calculated as the market capitalization at the end
of year t-1. BMj,t−1 is book to market ratio, calculated as firm’s book value divided by firm size
at the end of year t-1.
The coefficient of loseup is negative of -0.0133 and -0.0429 with significant t-value of -3.07 and
-6.58 in column 2 and column 3, respectively. The result indicates that the double down behavior
has a negative influence on the long-run 90 days and 180 days return for the recommended stock
by the double down analysts. The results also confirm the conclusion in Table 2 that the stock
recommended by the double down analyst is biased.
2.4.4 Does Double Down behavior affect analyst’s forecast accu-
racy?
To explore which possible reason leads the analyst to have the ”double down” behavior, I first test
whether the double down behavior could affect analyst’s forecast accuracy. One method to check
the whether analyst is defending the firm is to test analyst’s forecast accuracy for the same firm
next year when an analyst gets ”double down” behavior in the current year. If an analyst is trying
to defend the firm to build a good relationship with the firm’s management, then this analyst is
more likely to get higher forecast accuracy in the next year.
CHAPTER 2. TWO 44
I use the following empirical model to test the accuracy for analysts who have double down
behavior in the previous year.:
Accuracyi,j,t =Loseupi,j,t−1 +Accuracyi,j,t−1 +Boldnessi,j,t + Firm− Experiencei,j,t
+ LogFollowi,j,t +Breadthi,j,t +Gapi,j,t + εi,j,t
(2.3)
Accuracyi,j,t =Winupi,j,t−1 +Accuracyi,j,t−1 +Boldnessi,j,t + Firm− Experiencei,j,t
+ LogFollowi,j,t +Breadthi,j,t +Gapi,j,t + εi,j,t
(2.4)
The coefficient of Loseup is 0.0103 with a insignificant t-value of 1.30. The insignificant results
provide evidence that the double down behavior does not influence analyst’s forecast accuracy. This
result indicates that when an analyst is upgrading the stock that is experiencing a drop in stock
price and he believed to be high level previously, the analyst is not defending the firm. Compared
with the Loseup, the coefficient of the Winup is positive of 0.0223 wit a significant t-value of 3.67.
The Winup analysts in current year have a higher accuracy in the next year. The results of Table
2 show that the long-run abnormal return for stocks recommended by Winup analysts is much
higher then the stocks recommended by Loseup (double down) analysts. The higher accuracy for
the stocks recommended by Winup analysts indicates the fact that Winup analysts know their
recommended stock better than the Loseup analysts. The higher accuracy and positive abnormal
short-run and long-run return clearly show that Winup analysts have a significant advantage over
the Loseup analyst, no matter in market reaction or forecast accuracy. Combining the results from
Table 2 and Table 4, it is not hard to get a clear conclusion. The double down behavior is a bad
move and the upgrade recommendation inside the double down behavior is a overly optimistic bias
recommendation by double down analysts. The double down behavior is not a strategy applied by
analyst to defend the firm, it’s just a biased move by analyst in stock recommendation.
CHAPTER 2. TWO 45
2.4.5 Analysts characteristics that could affect the analysts Dou-
ble Down Strategy
To have a good understand of what kinds of analysts are more likely to have double down behavior, I
explore analyst characteristics that may affect analyst’s double down behavior. I apply the following
empirical Model:
Loseupi,j,t =Allstari,t + Loseupi,j,t−1 +Accuracyi,j,t−1 +Boldnessi,j,t + Experiencei,j,t+
LogFollowi,j,t +Breadthi,j,t + εi,j,t
(2.5)
Table 5 shows the results of what kinds of analyst characteristics could affect analyst’s double
down behavior. The coefficient of Star is -0.508 with a significant t-value of -7.90. This result indi-
cates that All-American analysts are less likely to have the double down behavior. The coefficient
of Loseupi,j,t−1 is 0.664 with a significant t-value of 4.4. This proves that an analyst would be
more likely to have double down behavior if this analyst used to have one in the previous year.
The coefficient of Lnfollow is -0.274 with a significant t-value of -9.57, which means analysts are
less likely to have the double down behavior when there are more analysts follow the same firm.
The other analyst’s forecast characteristic such as forecast accuracy, boldness, firm experience and
analyst’s breadth have no effect on the double down behavior. The fact that All-American analysts
are less likely to have the double down behavior indicate that this is a kind of behavior that are
not preferred by the analysts with high reputation and maybe hurtful for analysts.
2.4.6 What is the influence of Double Down behavior on an ana-
lyst’s career development
It is clear that the double down behavior is not the kind of strategy preferred by All-American
analysts and it is also obvious that the analysts who have the double down behavior are actually
performing badly in their recommendation update since the recommended stock’s long run return is
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much lower than fthe average of general upgrade. Does the double down behavior hurt an analyst
in his or her career development because of the bad move in recommendation update? Table 5
reports the results for the influence of double down behavior on analysts career path. I use 5
different measurements to measure the career path of an analyst. Stayup is a variable we use
from Kini et al. (2009), when an analyst is promoted to a brokerage house that is larger in the
number of analysts of that firm or stay in the same firm, the analyst is defined to have a status of
stayup. Demotion is another variable from Ke and Yu (2006), when an analyst is demoted from a
brokerage house that has more than 25 analysts to brokerage house that has less than 25 analysts,
the analyst is defined to be demotion. Exittop is a variable to measure analysts career path from
Hilary and Hsu (2013), when an analyst is demoted from a top 10 brokerage house to a non-top
10 brokerage house, the analyst is defined to be Exittop. Movetop is defined to be equal to 1 when
an analyst is promoted from a non top 10 brokerage house to a top 10 brokerage house or stay in
the top 10 brokerage house. All-star analyst is defined to be equal to 1 when an analyst is named
as All-American analyst by the magazine Institutional Investor. In the 5 measurements, Allstar
measurement is the well accepted and efficient to measure the promotion for an analysts career
path. The Stayup, Demo and Exittop is also used by previous literature to measure the analyst’s
move up and move down in his or her career development. I use all these 5 measurements in order
to see the influence of investor attention on the analysts career path from different views. The
empirical model we use to measure the career path of an analyst is as follows:
Stayupi,t =Loseupi,t−1 +Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1
+ Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(2.6)
Demoi,t =Loseupi,t−1 +Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1
+ Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(2.7)
CHAPTER 2. TWO 47
Exittopi,t =Loseupi,t−1 +Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1
+ Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(2.8)
Movetopi,t =Loseupi,t−1 +Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1
+ Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(2.9)
Allstari,t =Loseupi,t−1 +Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1 + Logfollowi,t−1
+ Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(2.10)
Table 6 presents the results of the logistic regression on the effect of double down on an analyst’s
career development. The coefficient of loseup is negative with -1.332 and has a significant z-statistics
of -3.3 in column 1. This result indicates that analyst with double down behavior in the previous
yer is less likely to get promoted to a larger brokerage firm in the following year. The coefficient
of losup is positive with 1.734 and a significant t-value of 3.22 in column 2. This result means
analyst with double down behavior in the previous year are more likely to get demoted to a smaller
brokerage firm with less than 25 analysts hired. The coefficient of loseup is -1.447 in column 5 with
a significant z-statistics of -2.37. Analysts with double down behavior in the last year are less likely
to be nominated as an All-American analyst in the next year. Combing the all results of Table 6,
it is obvious to make the judgment that double down behavior would hurt an analyst in his or her
career development.
2.4.7 The performance of double down analysts
I have shown that the double down behavior would hurt an analyst in his career development, but
what would happen to these analysts who have double down behavior in the rest of their career
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path? To find the answer of this question, I apply the method of Fang and Yasuda (2013). I define
analysts who have double down behavior in year t-1 to be ”Lose” analysts from t until the last
year in this analyst’s career. That means Losei,t,t+1,t+2...... is an indicator variable that is equal
to 1 if an analyst has double down behavior in year t-1. I check the abnormal return from the
”Sell” recommendation and the ”Buy” recommendation by ”Lose” analysts and the other analysts
by using the following method:
Rp,t −Rf,t =αp + βp(Rm,t −Rf,t) + spSMBt + hpHMLt +mpUMDt + εi,t−1 (2.11)
where Rp,t is portfolio’s return on month t; Rm,t and Rf,t are the market return and risk-free
rate on month t, and SMBt, HMLt and UMDt are the size, book-to-market, and momentum
factor, respectively. Table 7 presents the results for the FF-3 factors regression. The abnormal
return from the ”Buy” recommendation by the ”Lose” analysts and other analysts is 0.0158 and
0.0220, respectively. It is clear that the abnormal return generated by the ”Lose” analysts is
significantly lower than the other analysts. The lower abnormal return by ”Lose” analysts is
nor surprising because their previously bad move in stock recommendation upgrade is hurting their
future reputation. Investors does not respond the same to their recommendation upgrade compared
with the other analysts. When we look at the abnormal return from the ”Sell” recommendation
between the ”Lose” analysts and the other analysts, the abnormal return from ”Lose” analysts is -
0.0415, which is much higher than the abnormal return from the ”Sell” recommendation by the other
analysts, -0.0231. The investors respond more significantly to the ”Sell” recommendation by the
”Lose” analysts than the other analysts. This result is not surprising since the Sell recommendation
given by the aggressive analysts (”Lose” analysts) would be taken more seriously by the investors.
Combing all results from Table 7, it is obvious that the double down behavior would also hurt an
analyst’s market influential power in his future career path on his buy recommendation, but gives
more power to his sell recommendation.
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2.5 Conclusion
My study focus on exploring potential biased recommendation by analysts from their internal
characteristics and the influence of these biased recommendation on analysts’ career development,
forecast accuracy and the potential influence of these biased recommendation on investor’s in-
vestment decision. I find out that analysts who disagree to lower down his previous high rating
recommendation even after the stock is experiencing a significant drop is more likely to get demoted
to a smaller brokerage firm, less likely to be promoted to a larger brokerage firm and less likely to
become an all star analyst. I define this kind of behavior to be ”double down” behavior. Analysts
are issuing these biased recommendation because of his overconfidence instead of defending the
firm. These biased recommendation would mislead investors if they follow the recommendation
because the long-run return of these biased upgrade recommendation are significantly lower then
the average. Analysts tend to have this double down behavior in their early years but the frequency
of this behavior is getting less and less with the increase of general experience for an analyst.
My results are insightful for the study in financial analysts’ behavior and strategy. Analysts
should be more careful about upgrading a stock’s recommendation when a previous ”good” stock is
experiencing a significant drop in the stock price. Being overconfidence could hurt an analyst in his
career development but being conservative makes no hurt to an analyst. In other words, analysts
should try to avoid upgrade a stock when the stock is experiencing a significant drop in the stock
price even if he or she is confident about the upgrade.
My research is also meaningful for investors who care about analysts’ stock recommendation,
especially the upgrade recommendation. Before investors make their decision to follow a upgrade
stock recommendation and long the stock, investors should check both the analyst’s previous recom-
mendation about the same stock and whether the stock is experiencing a significant drop recently.
By paying more attention to the analysts and stock, investors could avoid the potential biased
recommendations.
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2.6 Tables









Number of Loseup Frequency Number of Winup Frequency
1 1357 1 1440
2 563 2 583
3 225 3 290
4 130 4 146
5 56 5 90
6 34 6 60
7 28 7 35
8 10 8 30
9 6 9 18
10 7 10 10
11 4 11 5
12 1 12 4
13 1 13 1
30 1 14 3
19 1
21 1
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Table 2.2: Abnormal return for double down in different time window
Loseup
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 1% 99%
CAR 61 4649 -0.01965 0.302021 -0.66220 0.92492
CAR 91 4649 -0.03734 0.359725 -0.76797 1.16284
CAR 180 4649 -0.07562 0.500323 -0.91796 1.66201
Winup
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 1% 99%
CAR 61 5802 0.023352 0.258556 -0.53881 0.85961
CAR 91 5802 0.030307 0.339427 -0.63285 1.10491
CAR 180 5802 0.049573 0.530008 -0.80132 1.89934
Upgrade
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 1% 99%
CAR 61 211750 0.007198 0.191441 -0.46578 0.58602
CAR 91 211782 0.008763 0.240287 -0.55476 0.74717
CAR 180 211867 0.012508 0.363453 -0.72601 1.17471
CHAPTER 2. TWO 52
Table 2.3: OLS Regression. This table presents the results of the influence of double down
behavior on the recommended stock’s long-run abnormal return.Loseupi,j,t is an indicator
variable that is defined in Section 4. Persisti,j,t is the quintile rank of analyst i on firm j based
on the excess returns earned from taking a long(short) position in upward(downard) revisions
associated with forecast revisions by analyst i for the preceding quarter. BrokerSizei,t is the
log number of analysts for the brokerage house of analyst i. Firm Experiencei,j,t is a the
number of years analyst i has covered firm j until year t.Sizej,t−1 is firm size, calculated as
the market capitalization at the end of year t-1. BMj,t−1 is book to market ratio, calculated
as Compustat annual item CEQ divided by firm size at the end of year t-1.
(1) (2) (3)
CAR 61 CAR 91 CAR 180
Loseupi,j,t -0.00296 -0.0133*** -0.0429***
(-0.86) (-3.07) (-6.58)
Persisti,j,t -0.000444 -0.000413 -0.000705
(-1.22) (-0.91) (-1.03)
Brokersizei,t -0.0000143 -0.00001000 -0.00000286
(-1.54) (-0.86) (-0.16)
Firm Experiencei,j,t 0.00207*** 0.00305*** 0.00510***
(12.76) (15.05) (16.69)
Sizej,t−1 0.0000263*** 0.0000293** 0.0000311*
(2.65) (2.36) (1.66)
BMj,t−1 0.0180*** 0.0267*** 0.0442***
(15.31) (18.14) (19.92)
N 145223 145230 145234
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: OLS Regression. This table presents the results of the different influence on
accuracy by ”Loseup” analysts and ”Winup” analysts. Accuracyi,j,t is the standardized
earnings forecast ranking of analyst i relative to other analysts follow firm j in quarter
t.Loseupi,j,t and Winupi,j,t are indicator variables defined in Section 4. Boldnessi,j,t is the
ranking result of the difference of quarterly earnings forecast by analyst i relative to the
consensus for the firm j in quarter t. Experiencei,j,t is the total number of quarters analyst
i exists in I/B/E/S until t. Followi,j,t is the total number of analysts following firm j in
quarter t. Gapi,j,t is the difference on calendar days between the public announcement date
for firm j and the last earning forecast date of analyst i in quarter t. Breadthi,j,t is the




























t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Logistic Regression. This table reports the influence of double down behav-
ior on analysts’ career development. Loseupi,j,t is an indicator variable defined in Section
4. Allstari,j,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i is nominated to be an
All-American analyst by the magazine Institutional Investor in year t. Accuracyi,j,t is the
standardized earnings forecast ranking of analyst i relative to other analysts follow firm j in
quarter t. RAi,j,t is defined in Section 4. LMEi,j,tis also a dummy variable if analyst applies
the last minute earning forecast revision strategy for firm j in quarter t. Boldnessi,j,t is the
ranking result of the difference of analyst quarterly earnings forecast by analyst i relative to
the consensus for the firm j in quarter t. Firm−Experiencei,j,t is the total number of quar-
ters analyst i follows firm j until t. Followi,j,t is the total number of analysts following firm
j in quarter t. Gapi,j,t is the difference on calendar days between the public announcement
date for firm j and the last earning forecast date of analyst i in quarter t. Breadthi,t is the



















t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Logistic Regression. This table presents the results of the effects analysts’ double
down behavior on analyst’s career development. Loseupi,t is a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 if an analyst has at least one time of double down behavior in the previous year. Stayupi,t
is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i is promoted to a larger brokerage house
or stay in the same brokerage house in year t. Demoi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to
1 if analyst i is demoted from a brokerage house that has more than 25 analysts to a smaller
brokerage house that has less than 25 analysts in year t. Exittopi,t is a dummy variable that
is equal to 1 if analyst i leaves a top 10 brokerage house in year t. Movetopi,t is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i moves from a non top 10 brokerage house into a top10
brokerage house in year t. Allstari,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i is
nominated to be an All-American analyst by the magazine Institutional Investor in year t.
Accuracyi,t is average of Accuracyi,j,t across all firms in year t for analyst i. Boldnessi,t is
the average Boldnessi,j,t for analyst i across all firms in year t. Firm−Experiencei,t is the
average of Firm− Experiencei,j,t across all firms for analyst i in year t. LnFollowi,t is the
average of LnFollowi,j,t across all firms for analyst i in year t. Breadthi,t is the number of
firms analyst i covered in year t.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stayupi,t Demoi,t Movetopi,t Exittopi,t Allstari,t
Loseupi,t−1 -1.332*** 1.734*** 0.589 0.760 -1.447**
(-3.30) (3.22) (0.70) (0.95) (-2.37)
Accuracyi,t−1 1.750*** -2.099*** -0.855*** -1.895*** 1.689***
(18.20) (-13.88) (-5.08) (-10.93) (13.56)
Boldnessi,t−1 0.368*** -0.478*** -0.355** -0.421** -0.873***
(3.75) (-3.15) (-2.05) (-2.41) (-6.67)
Breadthi,t−1 0.548*** -0.646*** -0.216 -0.659*** 2.932***
(7.40) (-5.58) (-1.60) (-4.92) (37.65)
Experiencei,t−1 -0.196*** 0.284*** -0.239*** 0.179*** 0.217***
(-8.17) (7.62) (-5.34) (4.14) (9.61)
LnFollowi,t−1 -0.235*** 0.322*** 0.180*** 0.393*** 0.583***
(-8.06) (7.01) (3.49) (7.34) (17.76)
N 61041 61041 61041 61041 61041
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
CHAPTER 2. TWO 56
Table 2.7: FF-3 factors Regression. This table presents the monthly alphas of 30-day holding
period portfolios that buy stocks at the close of the day before the recommendation date.
The buy portfolio include recommendations rated ”strong buy” and buy, the sell portfolios
include recommendations rated ”hold”, ”underperform” and ”sell”. Lose is an indicator
variable that is equal to 1 when an analyst is defined to be a ”Lose” analysts. Others refer
to the analysts that are not ”lose” analysts. Rp,t is portfolio’s return on month t; Rm,t is
market return, Rf,t is the risk-free rate on month t, SMBt, HMLt and UMDt are the size,
book-to-market, and momentum factor, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lose,Buy Lose,Sell Others,Buy Others,Sell
Excess Return on the Market 1.174∗∗∗ 1.248∗∗∗ 1.126∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗
(12.75) (10.32) (44.56) (35.05)
Small-Minus-Big Return 0.880∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗
(7.49) (3.22) (18.02) (11.72)
High-Minus-Low Return -0.0224 -0.112 -0.122∗∗∗ 0.0464
(-0.18) (-0.68) (-3.54) (1.09)
Momentum Factor -0.442∗∗∗ -0.549∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.320∗∗∗
(-5.88) (-5.57) (-6.71) (-12.57)
Constant 0.0158∗∗∗ -0.0415∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗ -0.0231∗∗∗
(4.05) (-8.11) (16.91) (-17.65)
Observations 224 224 224 224
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Chapter 3
Cost of Speaking in Two Different
Tongues
3.1 Introduction
Due to the large demand for financial analyst earnings forecasts and recommendations in recent
years, researchers are more and more interested in what affects analysts career development and
analysts’ forecast accuracy. It is meaningful and interesting to explore an analyst characteristic
that reflect both an analyst earnings forecast skill and recommendation skill at the same time. Mal-
mendier and Shanthikumar (2014) explore the motivation for an analyst to speak in two different
tongues. They find that some analysts strategically distort their earnings forecasts and recommen-
dations by giving relatively higher recommendation ratings and relatively lower earnings forecast.
They argue that it is the affiliation relationship between analysts’ brokerage house and their target
firms that leads them to speak in two different tongues. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014)
focus on the internal motivation of the strategy why analysts speak in two different tongues. For
example, the brokerage house may push the security analyst to give higher recommendation to
their target firms since the brokerage house is the IPO underwriter of the analyst’s target firm.
The internal motivations for analysts to speak in two different tongues are creative and insightful
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for researchers to understand analysts’ behavior and strategy in earnings forecasts and stock rec-
ommendation rating. However, questions regarded with the influence of this two tongue strategy
on analyst career path, analyst forecast accuracy and market reaction to analysts’ two tongues
strategy still remain unsolved.
In this paper, using the method from Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) to define the
analysts who speak in two different tongues, I explore the answers to these unsolved questions.
Does the two tongues strategy help analysts to earn a better career path? Does the two tongues
strategy contribute to improving the forecast accuracy for analysts? Does this two tongues strategy
help analysts to have more market influential power to move the stock price in their recommendation
and their earnings revision?
My research starts with testing the accuracy of the forecasts issued by analysts who apply two
tongues strategy. I test the accuracy of the forecasts made by analysts who apply the two tongues
strategy from a firm-year-analyst level and a year-analyst level. I find that the analysts who are
speaking in two tongues are less accurate in their two tongues target firms than the analysts who do
not speak in two tongue. I also explore the accuracy before the Regulation Fair Disclosure and after
the Regulation Fair Disclosure. The lower accuracy happens after the Regulation Fair Disclosure
but does not happen before Regulation Fair Disclosure. This result reflects the fact that Regulation
FD increases the cost for the two-tongue strategy. The lower firm-analyst level accuracy can not
be found when I check the accuracy in analyst level in contrast to analyst-firm level. This result
provides evidence that the two-tongue strategy is a firm-characteristics driven strategy instead of
a self-driven strategy. The Regulation Fair Disclosure does not have any effect on the accuracy for
the analysts who apply two tongues strategy in analyst level. Combining all the results in the effect
of two tongues strategy on accuracy, I confirm the results found by Malmendier and Shanthikumar
(2014), the two tongues strategy is driven by firm characteristics such as pressure from the analysts’
brokerage house.
The influence of the two tongues strategy on analyst career development is the next question
I explore in my paper. According to Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014), one of the internal
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reasons that some analysts apply the two tongues strategy is the analyst affiliation and other
proxies for incentive misalignment. Since I have found out that two tongues strategy would lower
the analysts forecast accuracy in their target firms. The lower accuracy clearly has a negative
impact for the analysts. So, after taking these negative impacts generated by their brokerage
house, would these analysts get a better career development from their brokerage house or a worse
results? A better career path is an indicator that the brokerage house is compensating for the
analyst for his contribution of bluffing the affiliated firm’s stock recommendation. On the other
hand, a worse career path is simply an indication that these analysts who have to speak in two
tongues must suffer from the results of being inconsistency between the earnings forecast and stock
recommendations. I use 4 different measurements to measure analyst career path. The results of
the logistic regression model show that analysts who take more frequent of the two tongues strategy
in the previous year are less likely to be promoted to be All-American analysts and promoted to be
a top 10 brokerage firm in the current year. These results indicate that the two tongues strategy
is actually hurting analysts in their career development.
Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) argue that one of the incentives for analysts to take the
two tongues strategic distortion in the forecast side and recommendation side is to use the high
recommendation to induce naive investors to purchase stocks, please management and generate
corporate finance business. I study the market reaction to the analysts who take the two tongues
strategy when they revise their recommendation and find that the market reaction is higher for ana-
lysts who take two tongues strategy. On the other side, when I test the market reaction to earnings
forecast revision by analysts who take the two tongues strategy, I do not find any different market
reaction. The fact that there exists higher market reaction in the recommendation side but not on
the earnings forecast side is consistent with the results from Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014)
paper. My results indicate analysts who take the two tongues strategy could hide the pessimistic
forecast behind the optimistic recommendation. Analysts who take the two tongues strategy could
please the management in this way. The general investors appear to ignore the negative information
in earnings forecast and react only to the optimistic information in recommendation.
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My study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I test the external cost for
the analysts who apply the two tongues strategy. My study is an extension of Malmendier and
Shanthikumar (2014), I point out the cost in the analyst career path who takes the two tongues
strategy. The negative influence on analyst career path by the two tongues strategy shows that
this two tongues game is not a cost free strategy that could be used by analysts to please the
management and induce the investors to make more purchase on recommended stocks. The cost is
obvious for the analysts, this result is consistent with Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) that
all star analysts do not prefer to take this strategy.
Second, I present evidence on the market reaction for the two tongues strategy. My empiri-
cal results show that the two tongues strategy helps the analyst to be more powerful in affecting
stock price when they revise their recommendation ratings but has no additional influence power
on analyst earnings forecast revision. Investors respond more positively to the high stock recom-
mendations but ignore the lower earnings forecast on the firm where analysts apply the two-tongue
strategy. This result is consistent with the previous study that the small and nave investors always
respond to the recommendation revision significantly while the large and sophisticated take limited
response to these recommendation revisions, the large investors even take no reaction to the buy
recommendations (Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007)). My results provide evidence to prove
the fact that the unsophisticated and naive investors are dominated by the analysts’ two-tongue
strategy.
Third, my paper confirms the argument by Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) that the
two tongues strategy is driven by firm characteristics such as pressure from the brokerage house
affiliation with the target firm. I show the influence of two tongues strategy on analyst forecast
accuracy in a firm-analyst level and analyst level. The lower accuracy in a firm-analyst level but
not analyst level reveals the fact that the influence of the two tongues strategy is a firm level.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the literature review. Section 3
presents the data and summarizes all the relevant variables I will use in the rest of paper. Section
4 presents empirical results and the interpretation of these results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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3.2 Literature Review
Analysts give both earnings forecast and stock recommendations ratings to provide information
for the benefit of their clients who lack the information and ability to conduct such kind of stock
analysis by themselves. A large body of literature has examined upward distortion of analyst
recommendation. Michaely (1999) give empirical evidence that analysts consciously issue upward
distortion recommendations to please the management and induce the investors to purchase the
stock. Chen and Matusmoto (2006) also showed that upward distortion recommendation is favor-
able by the management while the analysts who give relative low rating recommendations are likely
to be frozen out by the management. Interestingly, when analysts give earnings forecast, opposite
to their behavior when issuing stock recommendations, they are more likely to give a downward
distortion of earnings forecast. Analysts are often pressured by the management to lower down
their earnings forecasts a few days before the earnings announcement. This lowered down earn-
ings forecast allows the firm to easily meet or even beat the earnings forecast. Richardson (2004)
document that analysts issue pessimistic forecasts when it is closed to the firm’s annual earnings
announcement. Chan et al. (2009) argue that analysts intentionally lower down earnings forecasts
so that firms could avoid negative earnings surprises and get of positive earnings surprises. Hugon
and Muslu (2010) find a stronger market reaction to earnings forecast revision by more conservative
analysts. These papers talk about the distortion of higher recommendation ratings and distortion
of lower earnings forecast separately. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) combine the earnings
forecast side and recommendation rating side together and they find analysts whose brokerage
house is affiliated with their target firms are more likely to give relatively lower earnings forecast
and relatively higher stock recommendation ratings. To further explore the effect of the two tongues
strategy effect on analysts themselves, I combine the method used by previous literature to extend
the study by Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014).
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3.3 Data
I get actual annual earnings and annual analyst forecast data from the I/B/E/S Detailed History
files from 1994 to 2012. The analyst recommendation data is from I/B/E/S Detail Recommendation
files. To be consistent with the analyst forecast data, the sample period of analyst recommendation
data is also from 1994 to 2012. The data is started from 1994 because forecasts before 1994 may
be inaccurate due to the reason of batch delivery before 1994. I focus on annual forecast. For
each firm-analyst, I use the forecasts issued by the analyst before the earnings announcement but
following the previous earnings announcement because I will show the effect of forecast revision
of the two-tongue strategy on stock market in my analysis. Analyst employment information is
from the I/B/E/S database by reviewing an analysts brokerage house. Accounting data is from
Compustat annual data and stock data is from CRSP daily data.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Define the Two-Tongue Strategy
I strictly follow the method of Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) to define analyst’s two tongues
strategy. I first measure the optimism as the difference between an earnings forecast and the street
consensus and a recommendation and the recommendation consensus. I normalize the difference of
the earnings forecast by the stock price of the prior-day. I take the average of 3 month outstanding
forecasts to calculate the consensus. Since recommendations do not have a definite window as
earning forecast, I use a range of 3 month to form the consensus of recommendation ratings. After
I get the optimism for both earnings forecast and recommendation, I use the earnings optimism
minus the recommendation optimism.
EA Optimismi,j,t = (Forecasti,j,t − EA Consensusj,t)/abs(Pricej,t−1)
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Rec Optimismi,j,t = Recommendationi,j,t −Rec Consensusj,t
Two Tongue Metrici,j,t = EA Optimismi,j,t −Rec Optimismi,j,t
If the Two Tongue Metric is less than 0, then the Two Tonguei,j,t is defined to be 1 and this
analyst is defined to have two tongues strategy, otherwise 0.
3.4.2 Define control variables
To get meaningful and accurate rankings, I delete firms covered by fewer than 2 analysts. All the
control variables are ranked with a similar method as those used in previous papers.I use the method
of Hilary and Hsu (2013) to build the control variable of accuracy, boldness, gap,firm experience
and breadth.
The accuracy is defined in the following way:
Accuracyi,j,t = 1 − (ranki,j,t)/(number of analysts following firm j − 1) (3.1)
First, I calculate the forecast error for analyst in on firm j, then I take the absolute value of
this forecast error. Second, I rank all analysts covering firm j in quarter q based on the absolute
forecast error. In the last, I calculate the mean of the ranking scores and get the ranking variable.
Boldness is the absolute value of the difference between the forecast by analyst i and the street
consensus following Ke and Yu (2006). The street consensus is defined as the average of all the
other analysts forecasts for firm j within the past 90 days to the point of the forecast by analyst i for
firm j at time t. Gap is defined as the total number of calendar days between the analyst forecast
date and the firm public announcement date following Clement and Tse (2003). Firm-Experience
is defined following Hong and Kubik (2003a), which is the log of the number of quarters the analyst
has covered the firm. Experience is the log of the number of years the analyst has in the I/B/E/S
following. Breadth is defined following Hong and Kubik (2003b), which is the number of firms that
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the analyst gives forecast in a fiscal given year. Since I measure accuracy by rankings and to keep
the consistency, I also apply ranking variables for Boldness, Gap, Firm-Experience, Experience,
and Breadth.
3.4.3 Cost of the Two Tongues Strategy
When analysts apply the two-tongue strategy, they are issuing relatively lower earnings forecast
and relatively higher recommendation ratings. Is the relatively lower earnings forecast more closed
to actual earnings(more accurate) or more far away from the actual earnings(less accurate)? If
analysts are more accurate by applying the two-tongue strategy, then one of the external motivation
for analysts to take the two-tongue strategy is the high accuracy. If analysts are less accurate for
the firms they take the two-tongue strategy. Analysts are suffering from a cost of playing this
two-tongue game.
I use the following empirical model to test the accuracy of the two-tongue strategy from a
firm-analyst level:
Accuracyi,j,t =Two Tonguei,j,t +Accuracyi,j,t−1 +Boldnessi,j,t + Firm Experiencei,j,t
+ LogFollowi,j,t +Breadthi,j,t +Gapi,j,t + εi,j,t
(3.2)
The coefficient of the Two Tongue in the regression model in column 1 of Table 2 is negative
of -0.0103 with a significant t-value of -4.07. The results of Table 2 indicate that when analysts
are taking the two-tongue strategy on a frim, they are actually becoming less accurate in that
target firm. This lower forecast accuracy on the target firm is clearly a cost of applying the two
tongues strategy. Column 2 and Column 3 in table 2 shows the effect of the two tongues strategy
on accuracy before the Regulation Fair Disclosure and after the Regulation Fair Disclosure. The
two tongues strategy does not show any influence on the forecast accuracy before Regulation FD.
But the two tongues strategy hurt the analyst forecast accuracy after the Regulation FD. The
different results before and after the Regulation FD is because the Regulation FD asks for more
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fair disclosure for the public firms, the two tongues strategy analysts do not have a competitive
information advantage over the other non-two tongues strategy analyst in earnings forecast. So the
two tongues analysts show a lower accuracy at this point after the Regulation FD. A challenge to
the interpretation of the results in Table 2 is maybe the lower accuracy on the two tongues strategy
target firm is because the analysts are having a lower accuracy in a general level than the other
analysts. To solve this potential problem, I use the following empirical model to test the accuracy
of analysts’ two-tongue strategy from analyst level.
Accuracyi,t =Two Tonguei,j,t +Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t + Firm Experiencei,t+
LogFollowi,t +Breadthi,t +Gapi,t + εi,t
(3.3)
The results of Table 3 insight me that the two-tongue strategy would not influence the analyst
accuracy in an analyst level. The coefficient of the Two Tongue is 0.00142 with a insignificant
t-value of 0.75. This result is robust because the coefficient is of Two Tongue is also insignificant
before the Regulation FD and after the Regulation FD. Combining the results from Table 2 and
Table 3, I get the conclusion that when analysts are taking the two-tongue strategy, they will
tolerate the cost of losing some accuracy on the firm where they speak in two different tongues.
But this two-tongue strategy will not influence their accuracy in an analyst general level. The
results in Table 2 and Table 3 indicate that the two-tongue strategy is clearly a firm-driven strategy
instead of a general behavioral by security analyst. The result is consistent with Malmendier and
Shanthikumar (2014) results that the motivation of the two-tongue strategy is from the affiliation
of the brokerage house and the analyst’s target firm. The distortion on the earnings forecast side
by the analysts who apply the two-tongue strategy is strategic, but the cost for this is losing the
accuracy for their distorted firm.
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3.4.4 Check the career path of analysts who apply the two-tongue
strategy
Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) show that when an analyst takes a two-tongue strategy, he
is generating more trading for his brokerage house by inducing small and navie investors to buy
more. In other words, the two-tongue strategy could generate benefit for the brokerage house. But
according to the results I show above, the two-tongue strategy is also hurting analysts by making
their forecasts less accurate. Now I continue to explore the next question. If an analyst uses the
two-tongue strategy, what is the influence on their career development?
Table 4 reports the results for the influence of attention grabbing on analyst career path. I use
4 different measurements to measure the career path of an analyst. Stayup is a variable we use from
Kini et al. (2009), when an analyst is promoted to a brokerage house that is larger in the number
of analysts of that firm or stay in the same firm, the analyst is defined to have a status of stayup.
Demotion is another variable from Ke and Yu (2006), when an analyst is demoted from a brokerage
house that has more than 25 analysts to brokerage house that has less than 25 analysts, the analyst
is defined to be demotion. Movetop is defined to be equal to 1 when an analyst is promoted from
a non top 10 brokerage house to a top 10 brokerage house or stay in the top 10 brokerage house.
All-star analyst is defined to be equal to 1 when an analyst is named as All-American analyst by
the magazine Institutional Investor. In the 4 measurements, Movetop and Allstar measurement are
the well accepted and efficient to measure the promotion for an analyst career path. The Stayup
and Demo is also used by previous literature, but moving to a smaller brokerage house or staying in
the same brokerage house could not clearly picture the career demotion or promotion of an analyst.
I use all these 4 measurements in order to see the influence of investor attention on the analyst
career path from different views. The empirical model we use to measure the career path of an
analyst is as follows:
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Stayupi,t =Two Tonguei,t−1 +Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1 + Lnfollowi,t−1
+ Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(3.4)
Demoi,t =Two Tonguei,t−1 +Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1 + Lnfollowi,t−1
+ Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(3.5)
Movetopi,t =Two Tonguei,t−1 +Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1 + Lnfollowi,t−1
+ Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(3.6)
Allstari,t =Two Tonguei,t−1 +Accuracyi,t−1 +Boldnessi,t−1 +Breadthi,t−1 + Lnfollowi,t−1
+ Experiencei,t−1 + εi,t−1
(3.7)
Since I have proved that the two tongues strategy is a firm-driven strategy. So applying this
strategy should make no contribution to the analysts career development or even hurt the analyst
in his or her career development. If taking this strategy is helping the analysts in their career
path, then the firm-driven conclusion from my previous results is going to suffer from a potential
problem.
The coefficient of Two-Tongue is -0.53 for Column 3 in Table 4 with a significant z-statistic of
-22.42 and -0.256 in Column 4 with a significant z-statistic of -6.74. The coefficients of Two-Tongue
are insignificant in Column 1 and Column 2 of Table 4. The results of Table 4 show that the more
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frequent an analyst applies the two-tongue strategy in current year, the less likely that analyst
would to be promoted or stayed to the Top 10 brokerage house and less likely to be nominated to
be all-star analyst in the next year. The high frequency of applying the two-tongue strategy could
clearly hurt an analyst in his or her career development.Since the motivation of the two-tongue
strategy is generated from the internal affiliation of analysts’ brokerage house and their target firm,
not from the analysts’ motivation by themselves, this strategy is playing no positive role in helping
the two tongues analysts in their career development. This result confirms my previous argument
that the analysts’ two-tongue strategy is a firm-driven strategy instead of an analyst-driven strategy
because if an analysts apply this strategy to all his or her target firms, he or she will get hurt by
losing his or her forecast accuracy and getting punishment in his or her career development.
3.4.5 Market reaction for the analysts who apply the two-tongue
strategy
Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) point out that navie and unsophisticated investors react
more positively to analysts’ recommendation upgrade. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) also
argue that when analysts apply the two-tongue strategy, they are inducing small and naive investors
to buy more. But what is the market reaction to the earnings forecast revision and recommendation
revision when analysts are taking the two-tongue strategy? This is the question I would focus be
on in the following analysis.
To check the market reaction for the analysts who apply the two-tongue strategy, I use the model
from Hugon and Muslu (2010) to see the market reaction to analysts’ earning forecast revision when
they are taking the two-tongue strategy. The details of all the control variables are described in
Section 4.2.
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CARj,t =αj,t + Two− Tonguei,j,t ∗Revi,j,t + Two− Tonguei,j,t +Revi,j,t +AbsRevi,j,t+
LogSizej, t− 1 +BMj,t−1 + Lossj,t +Brokersizei,t−1 + Frequencyi,t−1+
Breadthi,t−1 + Firm− Experiencei,j,t + LogSizej, t− 1 ∗Revi,j,t+
BMj,t−1 ∗Revi,j,t + Lossj,t ∗Revi,j,t +Brokersizei,t−1 ∗Revi,j,t+
Frequencyi,t−1 ∗Revi,j,t +Breadthi,t−1 ∗Revi,j,t + Firm Experiencei,j,t ∗Revi,j,t
+ εi,j,t
(3.8)
Following Mikhail et al. (2004), I use the following model to test the market reaction for the
recommendations of analysts who apply the two-tongue strategy. The details of all the other control
variables are described in Section 4.2.
CARj,t =αj,t + Two− Tonguei,j,t ∗ Upgradei,j,t + Two− Tonguei,j,t + Upgradei,j,t+
Persisti,j,t + LogSizej, t− 1 +BMj,t−1 +Brokersizei,t−1+
Firm Experiencei,j,t + LogSizej, t− 1 ∗ Upgradei,j,t +BMj,t−1 ∗ Upgradei,j,t
+Brokersizei,t−1 ∗ Upgradei,j,t + Firm− Experiencei,j,t ∗ Upgradei,j,t + εi,j,t
(3.9)
The sign of the interaction between the forecast revision and the two-tongue strategy in Table 5
is 0.0363 and with a insignificant t-value of 1.81. That indicates the market reaction to analysts who
take two tongues strategy when they are revising their earnings forecasts is not significant. Two
tongues strategy means a lower earnings forecast than the consensus, which is easily to generate
a negative market reaction, but there is no evidence showing that the market reaction is more
negative compared with the earnings revision that is higher than the consensus.
Compared with the results in Table 5, the sign of the interaction term between upgrade and two-
tongue strategy in Table 6 is 0.00883 with a significant t-value of 3.99. The results of Table 6 show
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that the market reaction is more positive for the analysts who apply the two-tongue strategy when
they upgrade their recommendations. Combining the results from Table 5 and Table 6, I get the
conclusion that the unsophisticated investor could be dominated by the two-tongue strategy. They
react more positively to the recommendation upgrade even if the earnings revision is lower than
consensus on the same day. This result is consistent with the results Malmendier and Shanthikumar
(2007) that unsophisticated and naive investors care more about stock recommendation. The results
in Table 5 and Table 6 also prove the analysts who take the two-tongue strategy could hide the
relatively negative earnings revision news behind the positive recommendation ratings. The two
tongues strategy could help the analyst’s target firm to avoid a negative market reaction even with
a earnings forecast lower than the street consensus.
3.5 Conclusion
I find that analysts who apply the two-tongue strategy by issuing relatively lower earnings forecast
and relatively higher recommendation ratings are suffering a cost by becoming less accurate on their
earnings forecast in the target firms where they apply the two-tongue strategy. In addition, analyst
who take more frequent two tongues strategy are more likely to get punishment in their career path
by becoming less likely to be promoted to a top 10 brokerage house and less likely to be nominated
as an All-American analyst. After exploring the investor reaction to the analysts’ earnings revision
and recommendation revision, I find investors react more positively to the recommendation upgrade
but do not react more negatively to the lower earnings revision. The results prove that the naive
and unsophisticated investors are dominated by the analysts’ two-tongue strategy.
My results indicate that the two tongues strategy is a firm driven strategy, which confirms the
argument by Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014) that the motivation for analysts to take the two
tongues strategy is the affiliation relationship between analysts’ brokerage house and their target
firms.
My study is an extension of the work by Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014), I explore
the external results of the analysts’ two-tongue strategy and find the cost of this strategy. My
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conclusions are also intuitive for naive and unsophisticated investors, when these investors see
a higher stock recommendation relatively to the consensus, they should check whether there is
a relatively lower earnings forecast on the same stock issued by the same analyst by that day.
Investors should take both the recommendation and earnings forecast into consideration before
they decide whether to buy a stock or not.
3.6 Tables
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics. This table presents the summary statistics of the whole
sample in my analysis. The sample consists of all the analyst EPS forecasts in I/B/E/S
from 1994 to 2012.Panle A presents the descriptive statistics for analyst forecasts in a firm-
quarter-analyst level. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for earnings forecast in a
analyst-quarter level. Panel C gives the summary statistics in a analyst-year level.
Panel A
count mean sd min p50 max
Accuracy 59083 0.472 0.197 0 0.500 1
Two-Tongue 59083 0.230 0.377 0 0 1
Boldness 59083 0.499 0.162 0 0.494 1
Firm-Experience 59083 0.509 0.202 0 0.514 1
LnFollow 59083 2.644 0.533 1.099 2.708 4.543
Breadth 59083 0.574 0.271 0.0587 0.601 1
Gap 59083 0.540 0.230 0 0.501 1
Observations 59083
Panel B
count mean sd min p50 max
Accuracy 431217 0.500 0.311 0 0.500 1
Two-Tongue 431217 0.0480 0.214 0 0 1
Boldness 431217 0.500 0.316 0 0.500 1
Firm-Experience 431217 0.501 0.287 0 0.500 1
LnFollow 431217 2.580 0.700 1.099 2.639 4.543
Breadth 431217 0.501 0.318 0 0.500 1
Gap 431217 0.498 0.314 0 0.500 1
Observations 431217
Panel C
count mean sd min p50 max
Stayup 59767 0.945 0.227 0 1 1
Demo 59767 0.0218 0.146 0 0 1
Movetop 59767 0.286 0.452 0 0 1
Allstar 59767 0.0804 0.272 0 0 1
Two-Tongue 59767 0.237 0.425 0 0 1
Accuracy 59767 0.513 0.187 0 0.525 1
Boldness 59766 0.514 0.179 0 0.500 1
Breadth 59767 0.552 0.277 0.0600 0.575 1
LnFollow 59767 2.516 0.647 0 2.627 4.543
Experience 59767 1.207 0.842 0 1.099 2.944
Observations 59767
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Table 3.2: OLS Regression. This table presents the results of analyst’s accuracy for the
attention grabbing strategy in a firm-quarter-analyst level. Two Tonguei,j,t is a dummy
variable that equals to 1 if it the analyst gives a recommendation and earning forecast
satisfy the conditions in section 4. Accuracyi,j,t is the standardized earnings forecast ranking
of analyst i relative to other analysts follow firm j in quarter t. Boldnessi,j,t is the ranking
result of the deviation of analyst of quarterly earnings forecast by analyst i relative to the
consensus for the firm j in quarter t. Firm−Experiencei,j,t is the total number of quarters
analyst i follows firm j until t. LnFollowi,j,t is the log total number of analysts following firm
j in quarter t. Gapi,j,t is the difference on calendar days between the public announcement
date for firm j and the last earning forecast date of analyst i in quarter t. Breadthi,t is the
number of firms analyst i covered in quarter t.
(1) (2) (3)
Accuracyi,j,t Accuracyi,j,t Accuracyi,j,t





















N 431217 270676 160541
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.3: OLS Regression. This table presents the results of analyst’s accuracy for the
attention grabbing strategy in a quarter-analyst level. Accuracyi,t is average of Accuracyi,j,t
across all firms in year t for analyst i. Boldnessi,t is the average Boldnessi,j,t for analyst i
across all firms in quarter t. Firm−Experiencei,t is the average of Firm−Experiencei,j,t
across all firms for analyst i in quarter t. LnFollowi,t is the average of LnFollowi,j,t across
all firms for analyst i in quarter t. Gapi,t is the average of Gapi,j,t across all firms for analyst
i in quarter t. Breadthi,t is the number of firms analyst i covered in quarter t.
(1) (2) (3)
Accuracyi,t Accuracyi,t Accuracyi,t
Full Sample After FD Before FD



















N 59083 37044 22039
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.4: Logistic Regression. This table reports the influence of attention grabbing strategy
on analysts’ career path. Stayupi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i is
promoted to a larger brokerage house or stay in the same brokerage house in year t. Demoi,t
is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i is demoted from a brokerage house that
has more than 25 analysts to a smaller brokerage house that has less than 25 analysts in
year t. Exittopi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i leaves a top 10 brokerage
house in year t. Movetopi,t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i moves from a
non top 10 brokerage house into a top 10 brokerage house in year t. Allstari,t is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i is nominated to be an All-American analyst by the
magazine Institutional Investor in year t. Accuracyi,t is average of Accuracyi,j,t across all
firms in year t for analyst i. Boldnessi,t is the average Boldnessi,j,t for analyst i across all
firms in year t. Experiencei,t is the rank of average number of years the analysts have in
I/B/E/S. LnFollowi,t is the average of LnFollowi,j,t across all firms for analyst i in year t.
Breadthi,t is the number of firms analyst i covered in year t.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stayupi,t Demoi,t Movetopi,t AllStari,t
main
Two− Tonguei,t−1 0.0726 -0.110 -0.530∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗
(1.63) (-1.56) (-22.42) (-6.74)
Accuracyi,t−1 1.694
∗∗∗ -2.064∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗ 1.785∗∗∗
(17.39) (-13.56) (12.88) (14.37)
Boldnessi,t−1 0.394
∗∗∗ -0.465∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.552∗∗∗
(3.96) (-3.05) (-2.84) (-4.20)
Breadthi,t−1 0.493
∗∗∗ -0.581∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ 2.137∗∗∗
(6.26) (-4.75) (-5.44) (26.90)
LnFollowi,t−1 -0.226
∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.0197 0.988∗∗∗
(-7.47) (6.55) (1.31) (27.43)
Experiencei,t−1 -0.187
∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.0557∗∗∗ 1.105∗∗∗
(-6.93) (6.30) (4.01) (31.60)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 59766 59766 59766 59766
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: OLS Regression. This table reports the market reaction for analysts’ recommenda-
tion revision whey they apply the two-tongue strategy. Two−Tonguei,j,t is a dummy variable
that is equal to 1 if analyst i applies two-tongue strategy for firm j in year t. Upgradei,j,t is
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if analyst i gives a higher recommendation level for firm
j on year t. Persisti,j,t is the quintile rank of analysts based on the excess returns earned
from taking a long (short) position in their upward (downward) revisions associated with
their revisions for the preceding on-year period. BrokerSizei,t is the number of analysts for
the brokerage house of analyst i. Firm− Experiencei,j,t is a the number of years analyst i
has covered firm j until year t.Sizej,t−1 is firm size, calculated as the market capitalization
at the end of year t-1. BMj,t−1 is book to market ratio, calculated as Compustat annual




















Persisti,j,t−1 ∗ Upgradei,j,t 0.00357∗∗∗
(8.39)
Brokersizei,t−1 ∗ Upgradei,j,t 0.0000629∗∗∗
(4.78)
Firm− Experiencei,j,t ∗ Upgradei,j,t -0.00136∗∗∗
(-10.83)
LogSizej,t−1 ∗ Upgradei,j,t -0.0000380∗∗∗
(-2.95)





t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: OLS Regression. This table presents the results for the market reaction to ana-
lysts’ earnings forecast when they apply the two-tongue strategy.Revi,j,t is earnings forecast
revision of analyst i, calculated as forecast by analyst i at year t for firm j minus the mean con-
sensus forecast for firm j scaled by the nearest preceding monthly stock price. AbsRevi,j,t is
the absolute value of earnings forecast revision for analyst i. Lossi,j,t is dummy variable equal
to 1 if a firm has negative earnings in quarter t, otherwise 0.Sizej,t−1 is defined as the market
capitalization at the beginning of year t. BMj,t−1 is book to market ratio, calculated as Com-
pustat annual item CEQ divided by firm size at the end of year t-1. Firm−Experiencei,j,t
is a the number of years analyst i has covered firm j until year t.BrokerSizei,t is defined as
the log of the number of analysts hired by the brokerage firm of analyst i at the end of year
t-1. Freqi,t is the total number of earnings forecasts made by analyst i in year t. Breadthi,t
is the number of firms analyst i covered in year t.
(1)
CARj,t
Two − Tonguei,j,t ∗ Revi,j,t 0.0363∗
(1.81)
























Firm − Experiencei,j,t 0.000803∗∗∗
(5.51)
LogSizej,t−1 ∗ Revi,j,t -0.0132∗∗∗
(-8.78)
BMj,t−1 ∗ Revi,j,t -0.0146∗∗∗
(-10.80)
Lossj,t ∗ Revi,j,t -0.111∗∗∗
(-19.10)
LogBrokersizei,t−1 ∗ Revi,j,t 0.0181∗∗∗
(10.96)
Freqi,t−1 ∗ Revi,j,t -0.0233∗∗∗
(-7.03)
Breadthi,t ∗ Revi,j,t 0.00114∗∗∗
(3.14)
Firm − Experiencei,j,t ∗ Revi,j,t 0.0545∗∗∗
(15.02)
N 1408302
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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